The force of reason: An argument against David Hume's doctrine on the inertness of reason

Is human reason capable of being the direct cause of an action? David Hume's answer to this question was an unequivocal no. He argues that “reason is perfectly inert,” and instead claims that only our emotions are capable of moving us. The argument of this paper is that given Hume's empirical account of causation, as he establishes it in Book One of his Treatise of Human Nature, his inertia of reason doctrine fails. This paper will demonstrate that Hume has not shown—and perhaps cannot show—that reason is incapable of causing action.;The aim of this paper is not to further investigate or challenge the details of Hume's theory of causation. Instead, Hume's proposed theory is assumed true so that we may then use it to undermine and prove untenable the inertia of reason doctrine as Hume has presented it in books two and three of his Treatise. What this then implies is an incoherence or contradiction in Hume's philosophy: given the details of his causal theory, he is simply not entitled to simultaneously conclude that reason is inert.