The significance of contingent relations in the philosophy of law

This dissertation challenges the widely accepted presumption in analytic legal philosophy that understanding of law is to be gained by identifying law's necessary features, features which make law into what it is. I attempt to show that this staunch commitment exacerbates counter-productive divisions between analytic legal philosophy, moral and political theory, and social scientific investigation of life under law. The relative isolation of these investigations hampers the ability of legal theory to account for the full richness of life under law. My thesis is that analytic, conceptual investigation of law must be renovated to acknowledge the role and significance of contingent relations and features which are critical to a deeper account of the varying experiences of law in communities around the world, and part of an approach to resolution of some methodological disputes which unnecessarily hinder philosophical understanding of law. I argue that with recognition of the importance of contingent relations, such as law's relation to constitutionality, demands of practical reason, and official acceptance, points of intersection between analytic legal philosophy and moral, political, and social theory begin to emerge. Recognition of contingency demonstrates the under-appreciated dependence of analytic theories of law on empirical investigation, and also identifies issues left open for political decision and moral argument. These insights are obscured when only necessary features are pursued; empirical investigation is ignored since what is necessary is not liable to change or variation, and moral and political theory is ignored since it does not make sense to talk of what is left open for moral or political choice in an account of the necessary features of law. Yet if analytic legal philosophy is to combine its insights with those of complementary approaches, the prospect for continuity among approaches through identification and explanation of contingency must be pursued. This dissertation takes the pursuit of continuity as its aim.