The public and the private in Plato's 'Laws'

The abolition of the family and the inclusion of women in the guardian class are among the most well-known and frequently discussed aspects of the city of Plato's Republic. Less attention has been paid to the roles of women and the family in Plato's Laws, in which the Athenian Stranger constructs a "second-best" city-in-speech. The Athenian argues that women should be included in the city's common meals and in military training. Despite the emphasis the Athenian places on the importance of these proposals, however, he never implements them. In this thesis, I examine these proposals closely and trace the theme of the private sphere through the city's construction. I argue that we can gain clarity about women's position in the Laws by paying attention to two things: the progression of the legislation, and the rhetorical necessities operating on the Athenian in his attempt to write legislation for a new colony in cooperation with two conservative old men. I conclude that the attempt to integrate women into the city's public life must be understood in relation to the Athenian's larger aims for the city. While the new city's law code is modeled on the Dorian law of Crete and Sparta, the Athenian struggles to make this city far more progressive than Crete or Sparta in its openness to change, its philosophic theology, and its gentle treatment of blasphemers. Integrating women into the public sphere would be desirable, we learn, because it would weaken the traditional family, which Plato sees as a major source of intolerance and rigidity. However, the fact that the Athenian fails to implement the reforms that would transform the family is Plato's way of indicating that political life can never entirely rid itself of the characteristic defects of patriarchal rule. Examining the Athenian's failed struggle to implement these reforms allows us to see the obstacles that, in Plato's view, stand in the way of making political life more enlightened. Plato's views should be of interest to us, I argue, both in their own right and as a valuable point of contrast to the views of modern liberal thinkers.