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The Intractability of Philosophical Problems: D. Z. Phillips and the Nature of Philosophy

Posted on:2014-06-08Degree:Ph.DType:Thesis
University:The Claremont Graduate UniversityCandidate:Parise, StephenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2455390005484994Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:
This dissertation is an argument for the intractability of philosophical problems. More specifically my argument is that philosophical problems, per se, are necessarily insolvable. Though my argument contains implications for philosophical problems generally, I will focus on arguments regarding the problem of evil. The reason for this narrow focus is to allow for a full discussion and defense of my primary thesis. In addition to focusing on the philosophical problem of evil and the defense of my claim, I will pay special attention to certain arguments of D. Z. Phillips. My own position is derivative of, though not identical to, Phillips' philosophical view, namely, that philosophy is the act of conceptual elucidation, nothing more and nothing less.;The argument adheres to the "modus tollens" form of valid argumentation. Put as a "modus tollens" my argument is as follows: (1) If a problem is solvable, then it is theoretical, ontological, and generates consensus. (2) Philosophical problems are not theoretical, not ontological, and generate no consensus. (3) Therefore, philosophical problems are not solvable. My argument is not that each of these characteristics alone necessitate philosophy's intractability, but that together they suggest that philosophical problems may be necessarily intractable.;I defend my thesis by elucidating and defending parts of D. Z. Phillips' contemplative conception of philosophy. Phillips' work in the philosophy of religion provides an example of how thinking about the philosophical problems can be worthwhile even if they yield no solutions. While my position owes much to the work of Phillips, it is not simply a restatement of Phillips' position. My thesis is rooted in some of what Phillips wrote, but does not lead to a Wittgensteinian understanding of philosophy and religion. In summary, I will argue for a conception of philosophical problems that does not view them as theoretical, ontological, or requiring consensus. This conception is one rooted in, but not identical to, the philosophy of D. Z. Phillips.
Keywords/Search Tags:Philosophical problems, Phillips, Philosophy, Intractability, Argument
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