Essays in the economics of technology and innovation, and development economics

In this thesis I study two fields in economics. While my focus is on issues of knowledge and technology diffusion, my work also investigates the proletarianization of attached workers in agrarian economies. Each chapter constitutes a free-standing contribution to the field of the economics of technology and innovation or to development economics.; In Chapter 1, I empirically compare the pattern of knowledge flows associated with university patents to those of firm patents. Specifically, I explore the change in how more broadly university knowledge disseminates to subsequent patent holders and how more broadly patented university innovations draw from different prior art owners. The findings are that university knowledge flows concentrated substantially over the 1980s to resemble more the knowledge flows of firm patents. Moreover, I find the concentration of flows is caused mainly by universities experienced in patenting, suggesting these phenomena are unlikely to dissipate with experience.; In Chapter 2, I theoretically explore why firms leading a research and development (R&D) race sometime choose freely to disclose valuable technology. Disclosing basic knowledge only helps rivals far behind the lead to compete more strongly against the leader's closer and more threatening rivals, thus lowering the latter's incentives to perform R&D; with greater competition, the expected profits of these firms decreases. If disclosure harms close rival more than the leader, technology disclosure benefits the leader.; Finally, in Chapter 3, I propose a theory of the proletarianization of attached labour in agrarian economies. Where farm owners need to motivate worker effort with contingent payments but no institution exists to prevent farmers from cheating workers from these payments, workers may be paid with the use of subsistence plots. This facilitates contracting when farmer reputation is valuable; subsistence plots decrease the farmers' benefit of cheating workers relative to the cost workers may impose in retaliation. Proletarianization occurs as the price of the farmers' principle crop rises and farmers can commit to make more of the contingent payment in cash. The model also predicts workers become pure wage earners instantly once their rights are enforced. Both predictions are consistent with observations of the proletarianization of attached labour.