The Royal Navy, intelligence and strategy in the Mediterranean, 1936-1939

British intelligence presented a consistent view of Italy's capabilities: its economy would collapse under pressure, while the armed services could not secure a decision. Ideas that Italians were 'naturally' ill-suited to war shaped how intelligence was interpreted. The influence of intelligence on strategy is more complex. Britain planned for war against various combinations of Germany, Italy and Japan. Strategy was the result of a sophisticated exercise of evaluating intelligence alongside Britain's capabilities, commitments and objectives. Intelligence informed but did not determine strategy and mattered most when policymakers expected the Navy to have sufficient resources in the Mediterranean, which was not always the case. Intelligence, and the perceptions that shaped it, led to a revision of grand strategy in 1939. The Mediterranean replaced the Far East as Britain's second defence priority and although the revision initially appeared temporary, its underlying ideas, the intelligence and perceptions, lasted well into the Second World War.