Essays in Political Economy and the Economics of Organisations

This thesis groups three papers in applied microeconomic theory that focus on political economy and the economics of organisations.;The second chapter studies a directed search model of competition between sellers that control the quality of buyers' private information about goods. As better informed buyers extract more informational rents from trade, sellers may try to attract buyers by offering better information. First, I establish how the characteristics of exogenously fixed sale mechanisms determine equilibrium information provision. Information provision is higher under competition than under monopoly, yet partial information is provided for many sale mechanisms. Second, when sellers commit to both information provision and mechanisms, I identify simple conditions under which every equilibrium has full information. In these equilibria, sellers capture the efficiency gains of information provision and compete only over non-distortionary rents offered to buyers.;Retaining the option to develop a currently inactive project often requires maintaining specialised stocks of knowledge. However, standard models of experimentation treat the choice of one project over another as entailing only an implicit opportunity cost. In the third chapter, I characterise the optimal experimentation policy in a model in which undeveloped projects have explicit maintenance costs and can be irreversibly discarded. Projects which in the absence of maintenance costs would be developed only after more promising projects fail are sometimes developed first and then discarded early. Maintenance costs alter optimal project development by providing incentives to bring the option value of less promising projects forward.;The first chapter studies the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition party is free to choose a new platform. The model gives rise to novel equilibrium policy dynamics: governments alternate in power; parties compromise, that is, starting from differentiated ideological positions, they gradually move towards proposing platforms which resemble one another; however, they never capitulate, that is, party labels matter and parties maintain distinct policy goals.