| This dissertation analyzes the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) conduct of the forced disarmament, verification, and monitoring of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons from 1991 through 1998. Its addresses two primary research questions: (1) what lessons does UNSCOM offer about forced disarmament, verification, and monitoring of chemical and biological weapons programs; and (2) what lessons does UNSCOM offer about on-site inspection, the most intrusive means of verification? I use the process-tracing method to examine the two cases: UNSCOM's destruction, verification, and monitoring of Iraq's chemical weapons program from 1991 to 1998 and UNSCOM's destruction, verification, and monitoring of Iraq's biological weapons program from 1991 to 1998.;This dissertation tests the hypothesis that UNSCOM's successful destruction, verification, and monitoring were due to inspectors' innovations and tenacity, despite the obstacles and resistance from Iraq. I find evidence to support the hypothesis in the tactics inspectors developed to defeat Iraq's lack of cooperation and obstructionism, the successful disarmament of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, the thorough but incomplete conduct of verification, and in the successful set-up and use of comprehensive ongoing monitoring and verification systems.;This dissertation draws lessons about the standard, conduct, and effects of chemical and biological weapons verification and monitoring as well as about forced disarmament. Furthermore, it includes recommendations for policymakers to consider when faced with the forced disarmament of chemical and biological weapons programs in the future. |
