Hitting home: Coercive theory, air power, and authoritarian regimes

In order of priority, this dissertation is first about coercion, second air power, and third bombing strategies. The thesis derives a new school of coercion, neo-Clausewitzian compellence, to compete with the traditional coercive diplomacy approach, and a new strategy, regime punishment, which specifically targets the weaknesses of authoritarian regimes. Drawing these elements together, the thesis argues that air power can decisively compel over less-than-vital interests---if it is applied with neo-Clausewitzian vigor, and if it targets what the regime in power values most as opposed to any aggregate "national interests." In so doing, this thesis challenges the conventional wisdom about both coercion and air power through an in-depth exploration of coercive intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo.; Using these case studies, the dissertation also validates three practical observations about the dynamics of coercion in a real-world setting. First, if coercive diplomacy is pursued long enough, its boundaries become predictable, creating incentives for the would-be target to turn the tables through fait accomplis and brinkmanship games. Secondly, pursuing coercion through a coalition meant that the transition from coercive diplomacy to successful neo-Clausewitzian compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo came by way of some surprising civil-military interactions and the use of air power's unique attributes to manipulate the interventionists' internal debate. Finally, as the transition to neo-Clausewitzian compellence became more probable, the previous incentives for fait accomplis and brinkmanship became even more intense.