| Three studies explore the hypothesis that morality is defined by evolved social-cognitive abilities and social emotions tailored to the development of trusting and cooperative relationships with others. Study 1 will show a fundamental bias in moral judgment that functions to elevate one's conception of one's own moral reputation relative to others, and show that this bias extends to group-level social identities. Study 2 will address the cause of this bias, showing that the phenomenon does not result from self-serving automatic intuitions, but rather from the effect of self-serving motivated reasoning which operates in direct competition with more basic and automatic selfless intuitions. Study 3 will extend the social model beyond moral judgment to moral action, investigating the implications of group-membership on the experience of prosocial emotions as well as the frequency and degree of altruistic behavior. Taken together these studies suggest a need for a shift away from traditional arguments debating the relative importance of emotion and reason in moral judgment, and towards a consideration of the function of our moral capacities. Subjects were recruited from the Northeastern University introductory psychology participant pool. |
