| A commonly held interpretation of Pharaoh's and the Egyptians' thoughts and actions during the Exodus 6:28-11:19 and 12:29-32 pericope is that they are completely predetermined by YHWH. This position is particularly vexing given that these hard-theistic determinists still hold Pharaoh and the Egyptians responsible for their thoughts and deeds. This dissertation, however, argues that this hard-theistic deterministic position is textually untenable and that Pharaoh and the Egyptians are culpable for their thoughts and actions as free agents. Evidence to support this hypothesis begins with the well-founded presupposition that the signifier/signification relationship is univocal and that this signification is discoverable. Once this position is firmly established, a synchronic, lexical, grammatical, literal, historical, rhetorical, and philosophical hermeneutic is employed in the exegesis of this pericope providing support for the claim of Pharaoh's and the Egyptian's free agency and subsequent culpability. |
