U.S. intelligence and the Shah, 1957--1979: A case study of asymmetric intelligence liaison

This paper tests the hypothesis that asymmetric intelligence liaison is damaging to the competitive advantage of the state that appears to be getting the most out of the arrangement. This is one facet of Jennifer Sims's theory of intelligence liaison and is based on the logic that while one state may be benefiting in the short term from such an association, in the long term this situation represents either institutionalized intelligence dependency or a miscalculation on the part of the superordinate state of the true costs of the liaison. The hypothesis was tested using the U.S. -- Iranian intelligence relationship from 1957 to 1979 as a case study. I found that the relationship was allowed to devolve from a relatively equal partnership to a situation where the U.S. was largely dependent on the Shah for its collection against the Soviet Union, and therefore asymmetric. Both actors responded as predicted by the theory, but without success from the U.S. perspective. This suggests several refinements to the theory, including the necessity of determining the value of liaison for a particular partner vis-a-vis the target of the intelligence relationship in calculations of symmetry, and also the danger presented by uniquely valuable collection assets to such calculations.