1st Canadian Infantry Division and the Battle for Agira: A reconsideration of an incomplete historical consensus

In July 1943 the Allies launched Operation Husky, the invasion of Axis-held Sicily, as part of a grand strategy to erode German Army combat strength in preparation for a cross-channel invasion in 1944. Included in the invasion force was 1st Canadian Infantry Division (1 CID), embarking upon the first protracted Canadian ground campaign of the Second World War. The division fought its most intense battle of that campaign around the town of Agira in the very centre of the island. This towering ancient mountaintop town was a vital component to the main defence line erected by the Axis and stood squarely in front of 1 CID's path of advance. For five days the Canadians clashed bitterly with German and Italian units entrenched in positions that stretched several miles west of Agira. Through the cooperation of infantry and armour, along with the careful and deliberate application of the largest Canadian artillery and mortar fire-plan to date, Axis defenders were destroyed or captured and the town occupied.;Most historians claim the battle for Agira was a tactical blunder. The existing consensus suggests that the division was stopped by a numerically inferior enemy and that a reliance on artillery actually caused the attack to fail. That interpretation comes from an under-appreciation of Axis strength by historians and a misunderstanding of the strategic victory achieved by 1 CID. This thesis reveals that Axis formations actually enjoyed an advantage in combat strength over the attacking Canadians and also received crucial reinforcements as the action continued. Those reinforcements influenced the battle significantly and allowed for the decimation of large Axis units.