Channel Coordination Of A Retailer-led Green Supply Chain With A Fairness-concern Manufacturer

Global environmental changes have increasingly emphasized the importance of environmental protection,and the concept of green consumption is deeply rooted among the people.Many companies have also begun to adjust their strategic,regarding green development as their core competitiveness,and cooperate with upstream and downstream members of the supply chain to build the green supply chain.However,the implementation of green production will change the original cost structure of the supply chain and bring new challenges to supply chain management.How to improve the green level of products based on ensuring profit has become a research hotspot.In addition,many experiments and theoretical studies have shown that the members’ fairness concern will make the supply chain’s decision-making and coordination more complicated,and the fairness concern showed by different members will also have different effects on the results.In order to make the research more practical and reasonable,the fairness concern is introduced into the green supply chain management,combined with the channel structure,it is reasonable to consider the case that only the manufacturer is fairness concern.The article comprehensively uses game theory,optimization and other methods to explore the impact of the manufacturer’s fairness concern on green supply chain’s decision and coordination.In order to improve the supply chain’s competitiveness,further considers the situation that the retailer makes green marketing efforts at the same time,comprehensively explores the impact of fairness concern and sales effort on making decision and coordination.In order to solve the above problems,the green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer was taken as the research object,and the retailer-led Stackelberg game model was constructed.The fairness concerned manufacturer acts as the follower,who bears the cost of green production alone when both members benefit from green sales.By modeling and solving,the performance of the fairness concerned manufacturer and the fairness neutral retailer under centralized and decentralized circumstance is analyzed.What’s more,new insights of fairness issues in green supply chain are proposed.The results of the study show that:(1)Different from the situation that the manufacturer is leader and the retailer is follower who shows fairness concern,the manufacturer’s fairness concern can improve its own utility level while maintaining green level in the decentralized channel.(2)In order to improve the efficiency of decentralized channel,the retailer designs the green subsidy mechanism and marginal profit discount mechanism to guide the manufacturer produces optimal green level products,while ensuring the optimal profit of the entire supply chain,and achieve Pareto improvement for both members.Although the manufacturer’s fairness concern is beneficial for him to obtain more distribution profit,the distribution ratio will become smaller and smaller as it’s fairness concern increases.(3)When the manufacturer is fairness concern and environmental responsibility,if green research and development cost is expensive,the manager of supply chain is supposed to make decisions to increase retail price and sales quantity.(4)In the case that the manufacturer is fairness concern and the retailer makes sales effort,both the green level and sales effort decrease as the manufacturer’s fairness concern increases,however,both members are more motivated to participate in the coordination mechanism.Finally,numerical simulation is used to explore the impact of the manufacturer’s fairness on coordination mechanism.