Research On The Influence Of Merger Goodwill On Enterprise Financial Risk

In today's society,the development path of enterprises has become more diversified,more and more companies choose to improve business performance,expand production scale or carry out business transformation through mergers and acquisitions.The goodwill of mergers and acquisitions is generated in the process of mergers and acquisitions,which is theoretically a reflection of the excess profitability of enterprises after merger.But mergers and acquisitions can involve businesses that are unfamiliar or good at something,Overconfident managers will overestimate the effect and utilization rate of resource integration after merger and acquisition,and it is difficult for enterprises to obtain the expected excess returns.At the same time,the formation of huge goodwill requires a large amount of capital,and enterprises usually need to obtain a large amount of financing from the outside,which undoubtedly reduces the rationality of the capital structure of enterprises.Therefore,is there a potential financial risk behind the goodwill formed by high premium m&a?How can enterprises weaken the negative impact of m&a goodwill on financial risks?This is a subject worthy of study in academic and practical circles.This paper combines theoretical research with empirical research.This paper analyzes the correlation between the goodwill information and financial risk of A-share listed companies in 2007-2018,and further from the quality of internal control of listed companies and institutional investors holding two aspects to study the two factors for merger and acquisition goodwill between regulation relationship with financial risk.In order to expand the study on the economic consequences and financial risk factors of m&a goodwill.This paper is divided into five parts.The first chapter is the introduction.Based on the background of the prevalence of premium mergers and acquisitions,the research significance,research ideas,methods and innovative points of this paper are expounded.In addition,the literature on goodwill and financial risk of mergers and acquisitions is reviewed and reviewed.The second chapter is the concept definition and theoretical basis.The concepts of goodwill and financial risk are defined,and the overconfidence theory,principal-agent theory and management defense theory are expounded as the theoretical basis of this paper.Chapter three describes the current situation,theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Firstly,thestatus quo of goodwill and financial risks of listed companies' m&a is analyzed quantitatively.Then on this basis,the mechanism of action is expounded and relevant research hypotheses are derived.Chapter four is research design and empirical test.The samples of a-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 were screened,and the hypotheses were supported by descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,multiple regression and robustness test.Last part is the research conclusion and the policy suggestion,carries on the summary to the research conclusion of this paper and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestion.The empirical research in this paper finds that :(1)the goodwill of m&a of listed companies significantly increases the financial risks faced by the enterprises,and the conclusion is the same in the sample regression of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises;(2)high-quality internal control can effectively control the financial risks caused by premium m&a.(3)shareholding by institutional investors of listed companies can reduce the negative impact of m&a goodwill on financial risks of enterprises.The research contribution of this paper is as follows :(1)This paper focuses on the study of the influence of goodwill of mergers and acquisitions on the financial risk level of enterprises,and expands the scope of the study on the economic consequences of goodwill.(2)This paper adopts the multi-index model to quantitatively evaluate the financial risk of enterprises,and further considers the regulating effect of the quality of internal control of enterprises and the shareholding of institutional investors,thus enriching the research content of financial risk incentive.