Leading Accounting Executives And Enterprise Inefficient Investment

The efficiency of corporate investment activities not only affects the healthy growth of micro-enterprises,but also has a profound impact on the high-quality development of the macro economy.However,in China,the problem of low investment efficiency still exists in most enterprises,and inefficient investment behaviors such as insufficient investment and excessive investment have caused serious waste of resources.How to reduce the inefficient investment of enterprises and optimize the investment level has always been a difficult problem to be solved in the practical and theoretical circles.Talent is the key resource for the country to promote high-quality economic development,and human capital is the key for enterprises to gain a competitive advantage based on the market.As an important human capital,senior management personnel of an enterprise play a role that cannot be ignored in a series of investment activity decisions made by the enterprise.Against the background of China’s vigorously promoting the strategy of strengthening the country by talents,the Ministry of Finance officially launched the National Accounting Leadership(Reserve)Talent Cultivation Project in 2005,focusing on cultivating a group of high-quality,composite,international,and management that meet the requirements of social and economic development Leading accounting talents with a view to playing their important role in deepening the reform of corporate governance mechanisms,enhancing core competitiveness of enterprises,and promoting harmonious economic and social development.In the past fifteen years,the implementation effect of the leading accounting personnel training project and whether it has achieved the expected goals is the focus of practical circles,and it is also a research topic with important practical significance.Based on the above background,this thesis takes the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2018 as a sample,and uses corporate inefficient investment as a research perspective to use empirical score matching to empirically investigate the impact of leading accounting executives on corporate inefficient investment.Combined with the property rights system and governance structure,analyze the heterogeneous impact of different property rights and governance structures on the relationship between leading accounting executives and inefficient investment of enterprises,and finally the mechanism of the role of leading accounting executives influencing inefficient investment of enterprises test.The results show that: First,overall,accounting executives are able to curb inefficient investment by companies.Second,the restraint effect of leading accounting executives on inefficient investment in enterprises varies significantly under different property rights and the governance structure of two-in-one integration.Third,leading accounting talent executives have reduced the agency costs of enterprises and thus partially mediated the inefficient investment of enterprises.Compared with previous research,this thesis’ s contribution is mainly reflected in the following two aspects: First,this thesis combines the special system background of China to explore the new role characteristics of corporate executives,and invest in inefficient enterprises from the perspective of corporate executive professional training experience research on the influencing factors has enriched and expanded the research literature on the characteristics of executives and inefficient investment in enterprises.Secondly,this thesis not only examines the direct suppression effect of executive background characteristics on inefficient investment of enterprises,but also further verifies the indirect inhibition effect of executive background characteristics on corporate inefficient investment by reducing agency costs,which helps further open up executives.The black box of heterogeneous characteristics that affects investment decisions of enterprises.