| The separation of ownership and control will cause inconsistencies between the interests of shareholders and management,and the resulting agency problem is called the first type of agency problem.As more and more research focuses on agency issues,scholars have found that in most countries,the company's equity is owned by one or several shareholders.At this time,the controlling shareholder may occupy the company's resources for free by virtue of their own rights.,Trying to hollow out other shareholders,which led to the second type of agency problems between large shareholders and small and medium shareholders.The equity of listed companies in China is also owned by one or several shareholders,so these two types of agency problems inevitably exist.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to study agency governance issues with agency costs as an entry point.The ultimate goal of corporate governance is to reduce agency costs through various governance mechanisms(both internal and external).Most of the research has focused on the internal governance mechanism of the company,such as the effectiveness of the internal supervision mechanism,management incentives,etc.,and the current research also finds that the external governance mechanism,including analysts and media,can play a better supervisory role.There are many studies at home and abroad that have proven that analysts can improve corporate governance from certain angles,but few scholars have linked analysts and agency issues together for research.Based on the above considerations,this article focuses on whether analysts can use their professional advantages to effectively alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and management,large shareholders and small and medium shareholders,and because of the analyst's objectivity will be affected by various factors and Threats,so this article introduces institutional investor holdings to study its moderating effect on the relationship between analysts' concerns and two types of agency costs.In further research,the article also analyzes the mechanism by which analysts focus on reducing two types of agency costs,that is,how analysts focus on influencing the company 's two types of agency costs by affecting the internal control quality of the company,and from affecting corporate governance From the perspective of property rights,the samples are grouped,and whether the relationship between analysts' concerns and agency costs will change in different sub-samples is studied.This article is divided into six chapters.The first chapter is an introduction.First,the current background of the research theme and the theoretical and practical significance of the research on the theme are elaborated.Secondly,the research ideas of this article are elaborated in a way of proposing-analyzing-solving problems,and finally explained.In this paper,the research methods and main contributions.The second chapter is the literature review.First,it summarizes the supervision and governance effects and influencing factors of analysts' attention at home and abroad;secondly,it reviews the relevant literature on institutional investor shareholding and corporate governance;then,the origin of agency problems and the internal and external sources of agency costs are alleviated.The mechanism was sorted out.Finally,a summary review of the above documents is made.The third chapter is an overview of theory.Firstly,the concepts of analyst attention,institutional investors and agency costs are defined.Secondly,the relationship between analyst attention and the two types of agency costs is theoretically analyzed through reputation theory,information asymmetry theory and agency theory.Chapter 4 is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.Through deduction,this paper puts forward the hypothesis 1of the relationship between analysts' concerns and two types of agency costs,and introduces institutional investor holdings as a moderating variable.Hypothesis two.Chapter 5 is an empirical analysis.It selects the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 and establishes relevant models.Use descriptive statistics,correlation tests,multiple regression and other methods to verify the hypothesis.In order to make the empirical results more robust,this article uses variable substitution,independent variable lag one period,two-stage regression and other methods for testing.Chapter 6 is the research conclusion and suggestion.Make a summary based on the regression results of related variables,and put forward relevant suggestions and countermeasures.Based on reputation theory,signal asymmetry theory and agency theory,this paper uses literature analysis and empirical analysis to study whether analysts' concerns can effectively alleviate agency conflict and the moderating role of institutional investors.In further research,this paper also examines the role of analysts 'focus on reducing the costs of two types of agency,and the impact of the nature of property rights on the relationship between analysts' concerns and the costs of two types of agency.The study found that:(1)Analysts' attention has significantly reduced the cost of two types of agency.(2)In the case of other conditions being the same,institutional investor holdings inhibited analysts 'focus on reducing thecompany 's two types of agency costs.(3)Internal control quality is the complete intermediary variable that analysts focus on and the first type of agency costs,and part of the intermediary variable that analysts focus on and the second type of agency costs.(4)In non-state-owned enterprises,analysts can effectively alleviate agency conflicts between management and shareholders,as well as large shareholders and small and medium shareholders,with their own professional advantages.Agency conflicts among small and medium shareholders.Based on the above conclusions,this article puts forward four related suggestions.The research in this paper can provide new ideas for improving the governance mechanism of listed companies and effectively easing agency conflicts. |
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