Case Analysis Of Controlling And Tunneling Of Major Shareholders

Domestic capital market develops from planned economy to market economy,and the overall development time is relatively short.In the context of relieving the difficulties of state-owned enterprises and transferring the policy burden of Banks,the government established the securities market,introduced social capital into it,provided more development funds for state-owned enterprises and solved the problem of unreasonable capital structure at present.Therefore,many listed companies in the securities market are restructured from state-owned enterprises,with obvious characteristics of cross and pyramid shareholding.On this basis,the separation of control right and cash flow right is realized.Major shareholders make full use of the above two kinds of power to occupy corporate assets and related party transactions to obtain more private interests.With the continuous development of enterprises,this phenomenon becomes more and more common.It can be learned that the agency problem of enterprises is mainly reflected in the conflicts of interest between different levels of shareholders.Major shareholders may make full use of their power to seek personal gains in different forms,which will squeeze out the profits of smes to some extent.After the reform of tax incentives Regarding non-tradable shares,China has issued many policies in response to the actual situation,including information disclosure,financing,trading and other aspects.The introduction of these policies makes enterprises begin to pay attention to the transformation of the mode,so as to solve the relevant problems currently faced,but it does not play a great role in improving the competitive advantage of enterprises and perfecting the internal system.With the continuous introduction of policies,major shareholders' behavior and ways of using power for personal gain are more covert,thus increasing the work of regulatory departments.Related system is still imperfect in our country,the listed companies,even if there are irregularities,but the punishment cost is not high,and the size of the unbalanced information between shareholders,and the second agency problem is prominent,the number of violations occurred and no obvious decline,which infringes the vital interests of minority shareholders.Therefore,the analysis of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders is of obvious value to the sustainable and stable development of enterprises and the capital market.In this paper,based on principal-agent in the process of research,corporate governance,stakeholders,and control theory,adopt scientific and reasonable method,carding the related literature summary,on the basis of jyc technology as a case,analyzes the manifestation of hollowed behavior and the means,and on the reasons for this behavior,this paper brings to the market reaction is analyzed on the basis,and the impact of empty jyc technology major shareholder behavior research conclusion,and according to the conclusions from the ownership structure,internal and external governance Suggestions,laws and regulations,etc.The research results show that :(1)the motivation of the tunnelling of the company by the major shareholders of jinya technology is that the excessive concentration of equity leads to the "dominant share",the internal governance structure of the company is defective,the audit supervision function of relevant departments is not in place,the lack of laws and regulations leads to the low cost of violation,and the complex relationship between the major shareholders and related parties.(2)The tunneling method mainly includes the dividend policy of taking up the listed company's funds,related party transactions,illegal guarantee and non-benign payment of cash;(3)The tunnelling of the company by the major shareholders of Jinya Technology is mainly manifested in capital occupation,related party transactions and huge guarantees;(4)Tunneling of major shareholders has a great impact on the company's operating ability,interests of minority shareholders and the development of capital market.To sum up,it can be concluded that the shareholding structure of "one dominant share" provides channels for major shareholders to empty Jinya Technology.Major shareholders take various ways to empty Jinya Technology,while major shareholders empty Jinya Technology to reduce operating capacity.Empty through the jyc technology major shareholders of listed companies of case analysis,this paper argues that should take measures to restrain large shareholders from the following aspects emptied the behavior of listed companies:(1)to optimize the equity structure of listed companies,the introduction of cooperation with the enterprises or the relevant investment subject,change enterprise's ownership structure,to realize equity dispersion,improve the management level,realize the checks and balances.(2)Improve the corporate governance structure,strengthen the role of shareholders' meeting and board of directors in the governance of listed companies,and improve and perfect the system of the Board of Supervisors;(3)To establish an effective external governance mechanism,strengthen the supervision of intermediary institutions and give full play to the supervisory role of media,especially financial and economic media,by using the market power of control rights to more effectively restrain and restrict the behavior of major shareholders.(4)Improve relevant laws and regulations,promote thedevelopment of the cumulative voting system,impose administrative penalties and criminal sanctions on violators,and improve the information disclosure system of listed companies.(5)To examine the relationship between major shareholders and related parties,and give full play to the functions of examination and supervision.Mechanism members can directly report to relevant departments of THE CSRC,and let the CSRC get involved in the investigation of specific matters.