Research On Inventory Pledge Financing Game Based On Supply Chain Finance

Small and medium-sized enterprises are very important to the economic development of our country,and the financing difficulty is an important factor restricting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.Therefore,it is urgent to solve the financing problem of SMEs.Inventory pledge financing business based on supply chain finance is one of the effective ways to solve the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises.Among them,the difficulty of financing is largely caused by the information asymmetry in the credit market.This paper uses game theory and information asymmetry theory to study the financing mode of inventory pledge based on supply chain,and analyzes the financing decision-making of banks and third-party logistics enterprises under the mode of entrusted supervision and unified credit granting,so as to effectively solve the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises,help enterprises to reduce financing costs and improve the overall competitiveness of supply chain,which is of great significance to China's supply chain finance.Development has more important practical significance.The research of this paper has certain reference and guidance significance for the decision-making of banks and third-party logistics enterprises.This paper takes the decision-making of banks and logistics enterprises in inventory pledge financing business as the research object.First of all,according to the theory of supply chain finance and inventory pledge,this paper analyzes the capital gap of supply chain finance,analyzes three financing modes and differences,focuses on the business mode of inventory pledge and the risks of participants,points out the problems faced by inventory pledge,and establishes entrusted supervision and unified credit mode on the information asymmetry of bank and enterprise in inventory pledge financing.The game model of inventory pledge.Under the mode of entrusted supervision,this paper analyzes the collusion between logistics enterprises and loan enterprises,and establishes the financing decision-making model under the mechanism of reward and punishment.The analysis shows that only when the logistics enterprises bear a certain proportion of risk,the rewards and punishments of the banks to the logistics enterprises are effective.The higher the risk of the project invested by the borrowing enterprises,the higher the incentive factors the banks need to set up.This paper also analyzes the financing decision-making of each subject of inventory pledge under the unified credit mode,establishes the Stackelberg game model,and establishes the signal game model for the adverse selection risk of logistics enterprises.The research results show that the logistics enterprises take the lead in deciding the pledge rate according to the realization of the pledge,and the banks decide the financing interest rate again,which is more beneficial to both banks and logistics enterprises.In addition,the bank can collect higher margin to prevent the adverse selection risk of logistics enterprises,because when the margin exceeds the equilibrium value,the logistics enterprises with higher risk will refuse to cooperate with the bank in order to protect their own interests.