Analyst Attention,Internal Control And Firm’s Stickiness Of Cost

As an important content of enterprise management accounting,expense control is very important in enterprise expense management.The traditional cost habit theory believes that there is a symmetric linear relationship between expenses and income.In the gradual in-depth research,it is found that the relationship between expenses and income tends to show a more asymmetric linear relationship.This phenomenon is called "expenses" from the perspective of economics.viscosity".In my country,the research on cost stickiness is mainly carried out from the perspective of the existence and motivation of cost stickiness,and very few studies are explored from the perspective of corporate governance.At present,the research on cost stickiness governance focuses on the perspective of internal governance of the enterprise,and there are relatively few literatures on the research of cost stickiness from the perspective of external governance,especially from the perspective of analyst supervision.The research on the combination of analyst attention,internal control and cost stickiness hardly any.With the gradual maturity and prosperity of my country’s securities market,the securities analysis industry has also risen,and the team of analysts has grown.Analysts are considered to be compound professional knowledge talents,and they have stronger capabilities in information disclosure and mining.Existing research has proved that analysts can serve as an effective external governance mechanism.Based on the above considerations,this paper proposes that the analyst’s concern about whether it will inhibit the firm’s expense stickiness is studied,and examines the difference in the inhibitory effect of the analyst’s concerns on the firm’s expense stickiness at different levels of internal control quality.Whether there is substitution effect in internal control.Finally,it further explores whether star analysts’ concerns can strengthen the suppression of cost stickiness.Based on the three traditional theories of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry,and signal transmission,this paper mainly studies the relationship between analysts’ concerns and corporate expense stickiness,and the impact of internal control on analysts’ concerns and expense viscosity.First of all,this paper analyzes the current research background under this theme and the theoretical and practical significance brought by this theme research.Next,the three-step method of proposing-analysing-solving the problem elaborated the research ideas of this article and displayed them in the form of a frame,so as to grasp the ideas and methods of thefull text more clearly.Then,in the second chapter,this article systematically sorts out and summarizes the relevant subject literature,which is mainly divided into three parts: research on cost stickiness,research focused on analysts,and research related to internal control.After sorting out the literature,the third chapter first introduces the definition of cost stickiness,analyst attention,and internal control.Then,an overview of the theoretical basis.Next,Chapter 4 elaborate on the mechanism of analysts’ focus on expense stickiness and the mechanism of internal control and analysts’ focus on substitution effect when suppressing expense stickiness.Based on the analysis of the mechanism of the above relationship,this paper puts forward two major research hypotheses: analysts’ attention can effectively suppress the phenomenon of corporate cost stickiness;furthermore,when the company is in a lower level of internal control,analysts focus on the suppression of synergies of cost stickiness More notably,analysts’ attention and internal control have substitution effects.In Chapter V,this article tests the relevant hypotheses through empirical research,selects the 2008-2017 data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies,and establishes a relevant model.Descriptive statistics,correlation tests,multiple regression and other methods were used to verify that analysts’ concerns would suppress corporate cost stickiness,and through grouping,the internal control and analysts’ attention to internal and external governance mechanisms were used to verify the substitution effect of suppressing cost stickiness.In addition,in order to make the empirical results more robust and credible,this paper mainly adopts the following methods for testing:replacing related variables,cluster regression,Hukman test,and propensity score method to ensure that the empirical regression results are true and correct.In the last chapter,based on the regression results of related variables,this article briefly and accurately summarizes.Then,according to the conclusion of the study,the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.It mainly starts from the three thematic variables of this article,including the proposals of external governance mechanism analysts and their industries,the construction and improvement of internal control mechanism internal control,and the combined use of internal and external governance mechanisms.Because there are many limitations in the research of this article,it mainly includes that the model construction cannot directly measure the sticky index,the single interpretation from the perspective of opportunistic motivation,and the future can be further explored from the analyst heterogeneity level.In the end,this article also sorted out and summarized thislimitation,and put forward some prospects on this basis.Through theoretical and empirical tests,this paper finds that analysts’ attention will suppress the firm’s expense stickiness,but under different levels of internal control quality,the analyst’s inhibitory effect on firm’s fee stickiness is different.When the internal control quality level is low,the analyst’s focus on the suppression of corporate expense stickiness is stronger than the internal control quality level,that is,there is a substitution effect between the external governance mechanism analyst’s focus and the internal governance mechanism’s internal control.And in further research,this article also found that star analysts will further strengthen the suppression of corporate expense stickiness.When the quality level of internal control is different,star analysts also show significant differences in the suppression of corporate expense stickiness.