External Fairness Of Pay,Expectations Of Political Promotion,and Voluntary Changes By Executives

As the decision maker of the company's business strategy,executives are responsible for the operation and management of the entire company,affecting the future operation and development of the company.How to effectively improve the enthusiasm of the executives and maintain the stability of the executive team has been the focus of research.The reform of the salary system has always been an important part of the reform of state-owned enterprises,and the compensation of executives of state-owned enterprises has been continuously reformed and improved.Since the 18 th CPC National Congress,the salary control has been further strengthened,and the high,excessively high income and unreasonable business expenses of central enterprise leaders have been strictly controlled.At this time,how to formulate a scientific and effective executive incentive mechanism to increase the vitality of state-owned enterprises and reduce the loss of competent executives has become a key link in the reform of state-owned enterprises.In the past,scholars' research on compensation incentives mainly focused on the internal compensation gap and its impact on corporate value,but less on the external fairness of compensation and the impact of compensation gap on executive behavior.This article reviews domestic and foreign literature,and based on previous studies,based on the principal-agent theory,fairness theory,and implicit contract theory,studies the relationship between the external fairness of salary and the voluntary resignation of state-owned enterprise executives,and further studies on political promotion expectations how to mediate the external fairness of pay and the voluntary turnover of executives.This article takes 2011-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies as a sample,and incorporates external fairness of pay and political promotion expectations into the analysis framework that affects the voluntary resignation of state-owned enterprise executives.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)There is no significant relationship between the positive external bonus and the probability of voluntary turnover of senior executives,and the negative external bonus is positively related to the probability of voluntary turnover of senior executives.The greater the degree,the greater the probability of voluntary resignation of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises;(2)the greater the expected political promotion of senior executives,the lower the probability of voluntary resignation;(3)the political promotionis expected to have a negative regulating effect on the positive relationship between extra pay and the voluntary departure of state-owned enterprise executives.The significance and innovation of this article's lies in the following: first,the measurement of executive market compensation is more comprehensive.This article expands the compensation decision model of Core and Li Wei'an,and builds the salary decision model of Chinese listed companies from the four dimensions of market power,corporate governance,equity structure,and human capital.Second,the current research on executive changes at home and abroad,mostly discussed about mandatory change of executives.This article discusses the voluntary change of executives,which enriches the research perspective.Third,while studying the relationship,this article introduces the variable of political promotion expectations from a new perspective.Starting to study the relationship between the external fairness of salary and the change of executives has enriched the research and has certain reference significance for the establishment of a scientific and effective executive incentive mechanism for state-owned enterprises.The research in this article can provide empirical evidence for state-owned enterprises to formulate scientific and reasonable executive incentive mechanisms,improve the motivation of senior executives,maintain the stability of senior executive teams,and reduce the loss of executive talent.