Research On The Influence By Implementing Managers’ Payments Limiting Policies On National Companies’ Performances

The reform of the compensation system of State-owned enterprises is the key link in the deepening reform of state-However,with the further development of market economy,there are unreasonable phenomena such as high executive pay in state-owned enterprises.In order to prevent the widening gap between the average remuneration of executives and employees in state-owned enterprises,six ministries,such as the Ministry of Human Resources and security,and the Politburo of the CPC in 2014,respectively,considered and adopted relevant resolutions to make corresponding provisions on the gap between the average remuneration of executives and employees of state-owned enterprises.Based on the "tournament theory",the average pay gap between executives and employees is expanded,which is conducive to motivating executives and employees,and thus improving enterprise performance.Many studies at home and abroad have also verified the practicality of the theory.In view of the shortcomings of the existing research,this paper analyzes the gap between the executives,employees and the average compensation of the state-owned enterprises,based on the restrictive policies of the relevant departments on the executive pay of state-owned enterprises in 2009 and 2014,and applies the multiplication method(Difference in Differences)examined the impact of two executive pay restriction policies on the market performance and financial performance of state-owned enterprises.On this basis,the influence of enterprise scale heterogeneity on the function ability of executive compensation restriction policy is investigated by using the methodof decimal regression.Then,through the classification discussion,the performance of different industries and enterprises of different nature is further explored,which shows the difference under the influence ability of executive compensation restriction policy.Then it puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions on promoting the construction of marketization salary incentive in state-owned enterprises,perfecting the differentiated salary incentive system of state-owned enterprises and improving the evaluation methods of executive management performance of state-owned enterprises.Then,through the classification discussion,the performance of different industries and enterprises of different nature is further explored,which shows the difference under the influence ability of executive compensation restriction policy.The results show that the formulation and implementation of the salary limit policy of two state-owned enterprises have a negative impact on the market performance and financial performance of state-owned enterprises,and the limited salary policy has a strong ability to influence the market performance of state-owned enterprises,and the ability to influence financial performance is weak.Through the analysis of scale heterogeneity,industry heterogeneity and property heterogeneity of sample enterprises,it is found that there are obvious differences in the effect of salary limit policy on the performance of state-owned enterprises of different scale,different industries and different nature.and the negative impact of the 2014-year executive pay-as-you-go policy on the performance of state-owned enterprises is significantly more significant than that of state-owned enterprises in the 2009.