| Since the 1970 s,many scholars have found that the shareholding structure of most countries is concentrated.Under this ownership model,the most fundamental issue of corporate governance is no longer the agency conflict between shareholders and managers.Instead,the controlling shareholder uses control rights to realize private benefits and encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders.In China,the original intention of establishing the stock market was to increase capital and debt for state-owned enterprises,and to solve the shortage of funds.However,the "one-size-owned" shareholding structure of state-owned shares has caused some companies to operate in an unsatisfactory manner,abuse their control rights to grab private benefits,this phenomenon has an adverse impact on the stable development and sustainable progress of enterprises and even the entire capital market in China.When the controlling shareholder finally adopted the "share-for-debt" approach,control was passively transferred,and even the controlling shareholder changed accordingly.Through previous research,it has been found that after the privatization of state-owned enterprises,the operating performance of enterprises may not be significantly improved due to the existence of private benefits,and Lianhua Weijing is one of the typical examples.However,under the different nature of controlling shareholders and increasingly perfect institutional environment,there may be similarities and differences between the motives,realization methods and influencing factors of private benefits.This article will start from the perspective of its transfer of control and conduct a comparative study on this,which has certain theoretical and practical significance.Firstly,it combs the relevant researches on the concept,realization method and corporate governance factors that affect the private benefits,and analyzes related theories.Then it introduces the transfer process of Lianhua Weijing,and the compiling of private benefits by different controlling shareholders,and then makes a comparative analysis of the purpose,methods and influencing factors of the private benefits realized at different stages.The study found that during the period of state-owned holding,the controlling shareholder relied on the absolute control position to maintain the internal governance mechanism of the listed company in the name of absolute control power,and to control the decision-making power of various major matters.At the same time,the company had sufficient sources of debt funds,so the controlling shareholder adopted a more direct way of capital occupancy,coupled with the limited role of the external governance environment,and private benefits can be successfully realized;while in the private holding period,although the concentration of equity had decreased,the degree of equity checks and balances had without improvement,the decision-making power was still subject to the controlling shareholder.Taking their own interests as the orientation,they hope to increase the separation of cash flow rights and control rights through the use of various "technologies" such as equity pledges and directional additional issuance,and then implemented the encroachment of interests;with the establishment of internal control systems,the degree of legal protection,as a result of the improvement and the governance of the media,the level of private benefits had decreased.Finally,the article points out that the fundamental reason for the private benefits lies in the internal defects of the corporate governance system,and proposes to improve both the shareholding structure and the functions of the board of directors,and establish a more effective external supervision system. |
