Research On The Issue Of The Implementation Of The Bottom-up Holdings Of Kelu Electronics Co., Ltd

In the summer of 2015,China’s stock market experienced a short-term slump,under which the state issued a series of emergency rescue measures.It was in the context of such a "stock disaster",“risk-free” shareholding increasing appeared that some company’s actual controller or chairman encouraged employees to increase stock holdings with additional promise to compensate individually for related loses,and the profits would be owned by the employees themselves.At one time,the actual controller who peddled for employees was praised as "China’s good boss".After several companies issued the announcement of “risk-free” shareholding increasing,their share prices also rose and fell one after another.In recent years,the increase of “risk-free” shareholding has occurred frequently,but at present,the existing discussion and research are mostly focused on its motivation and effect,and there is a research gap in the theoretical analysis of the problems existing in the announcement implementation.In this context,this paper selected ShenZhen Clou Electronices Co.,Ltd.,a “weather vane” company that frequently carries out bottom-feeding overweight during the stock market downturn,as an object for research.Firstly,this paper defined the meaning of “risk-free” shareholding and summarized its background and development process.Secondly,this paper introduced three times before and after the ShenZhen Clou Electronices Co.,Ltd.to stake out type scheme,and found that it has not achieved the expected good effect.Based on this center,the paper combined the market timing hypothesis and incentive theory,to analyze the problems from the behaviors of employee incentives and major shareholders shareholding increase,and found out the theoretical motivation behind the failure of the two behavior and also discussed the relationship between the two.In addition,in view of the problem that the accounting treatment of this company is not clear,this paper found that it was also related to the unfavorable effect of increasing holdings.In this case,enterprises usually choose the accounting treatment method that is conducive to their own performance,and this paper also puts forward the proposed accounting treatment method.Finally,this paper provides feasible suggestions and measures from the aspects of information disclosure,scheme design and accounting treatment according to the above theoretical differences,which could provide reference way for similar companies,investors and our nation.