The Impact Of Refinancing Policy Adjustment In 2017 On Listed Companies’ Refinancing

The impact of changes in regulatory policies on China’s capital market is vital.However,past studies on the Listed Companies’ refinancing rarely consider the influence of policy.In 2017,the China Securities Regulatory Commission continuously implemented a series of regulatory policy to regulate some problems arising in the refinancing market,which may have an impact on the refinancing of listed companies.The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of these policy adjustments in 2017 on the choice of refinancing methods of listed companies,and further study the impact on market reactions of listed companies’ refinancing,so as to fully verify the economic consequences of the adjustment and provide empirical evidence for the improvement of supervision.Through empirical research,based on 3839 samples of companies which issued the private placement or convertible bond plan between 2012 and October 2018,we found that:(1)the refinancing policy adjustment in 2017 has a significant impact on the listed companies’ choice of refinancing methods.After the new policies,the listed companies tends to choose the convertible bonds instead of the private placement.(2)The size of the company and the nature of the company will have a regulatory effect on the impact of the refinancing policy adjustment.Larger companies will not choose convertible bonds due to the introduction of refinancing policy adjustment in 2017;compared with private enterprises,the choice of refinancing methods of state-owned enterprises is less affected by the adjustment of refinancing policies in 2017;(3)before the refinancing policy adjustment in 2017,The market reactions of private placement is positive,but after the adjustment,the market reactions of private placement is worse and be negative,indicating that the policy has not only changed the choice of refinancing methods,but also caused additional losses for companies that choose private placement;(4)There is no significant relationship between the market reactions of China’s private placement and the participation of institutional investors,so the market reactions can not be well explained by information effects hypothesis and monitoring effects hypothesis.The results of this paper can provide a reference for further improvement of supervision.