Research On Control Rights And Bond Defaults Of The Private Listed Companies

The issue of corporate credit risk has been receiving widespread attention from academia and practice.With the development of China’s economy,the amount of direct financing such as bond financing will also continue to increase.However,since 2018,due to the impact of macroeconomic conditions and the "deleveraging" policy,external financing channels of enterprises have been blocked,and a large number of private companies have defaulted,which has led the rise of private corporate bond financing costs.Now,the credit risk of enterprises has become the most concerned issue for investors and regulators.However,in the current theoretical world,the research on corporate credit risk is mostly focused on the perspective of financial characteristics,less research on corporate governance,and there is even less literature on bond default studies from the perspective of control.In fact,there are phenomena that the actual controllers seek private interest and abuse the power behind the default of bonds of listed companies such as Kang De Xin Co.,Ltd and Zhong Hong Co.,Ltd.Therefore,this paper focuses on the perspective of corporate control,and discusses its impact mechanism on bond default risk.In addition,due to the opportunity of a large number of defaults of bonds of Listed Companies in 2018,research is carried out from the perspective of substantive defaults of enterprises which more accurately measure the risk of corporate debt default.This paper will use case analysis,theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to study the impact of control rights on corporate bond default risk.First of all,this paper analyzes the case of the "15 Zhong An Xiao" bond default,and proposes two influence mechanisms: private benefits of control and overconfidence.Then,this paper uses the existing literatures to support these two influence mechanisms,and puts forward the corresponding research hypotheses.Finally,this paper uses 25 private listed companies as bond default samples,and selects A-share private listed companies in the same industry as the control group for empirical test.The empirical test found that: 1)The higher the concentration of the actual controller’s control power,the greater the probability of default;2)The higher the concentration of the actual controller’s control power,the more serious the phenomenon of seeking private benefits of control is,which further increases the probability of the listed company’s bond defaults;3)The higher the concentration of the actual controller’s control power,the more serious the overconfidence of the controller is,which further increases the probability of the listed company’s bond defaults.In this paper,control right and bond default are connected through two mechanisms: private benefits of control and overconfidence.The research is carried out from the perspective of enterprise material breach by logit model.At the same time,according to the research results,this paper puts forward relevant risk management suggestions from the perspective of the control right,which has a practical significance for the listed companies to improve their governance structure,investors to make investment decisions,and financial regulatory departments to control the market.