| With the continuous development of China’s capital market,the financing needs of enterprises have also increased.It?s difficult for traditional financing channels to meet the needs of enterprises.As a new financing channel,private equity financing is gradually being introduced into China’s capital market,alleviating the difficulty of corporate financing.Due to the low market transparency and the problem of information asymmetry,investors often sign gambling agreements with the financing parties in order to protect their own interests,reduce investment risks,and reasonably adjust the valuation differences between them.A reasonable betting agreement can provide incentives to management and drive long-term development of the company.However,if the terms of the agreement are unreasonably set and the performance targets are too high,under performance pressure,management may make financial fraud in order to avoid the possibility of compensation.Among them,due to the characteristics of low fraud costs,difficulty in taking inventory of biological assets,hidden related-party transactions,and the existence of a large amount of cash transactions,agricultural enterprises participating in Valuation Adjustment Mechanism have caused frequent financial frauds in the agricultural industry.This seriously damages the interests of investors,disrupts socioeconomic confidence and order,hinder socio-economic development.What?s more,the financing party will ruin its future development due to fraud.It seems that the financing party would win the ?gambling pie?,but in fact it would fall into the ?gambling trap?.This article selects the case of Xinqiu Agriculture,which implements financial fraud in order to complete the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism.This article is divided into six parts: The first chapter introduction,introduces the research background and significance,the research status and research methods at home and abroad;The second chapter is a theoretical overview,which introduces the concepts related to the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism and financial fraud and the theoretical basis used;The third chapter introduces the case,explaining the content of the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism,the result of the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism,the means of implementing financial fraud and the "prisoner’s dilemma" after the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism.;The fourth chapter is case analysis.It first points out that the unreasonable agreement content will make it difficult for management to bear the pressure and cause fraud motives,so as to find out the correlation between the Valuation Adjustment Mechanism and financial fraud,and identify the mechanism of financial fraud.Then the GONE theory would be used to analyze the causes of fraud from four aspects: greed,opportunity,need and exposure.Finally,teach investors how to identify signs of financial fraud and analyze the consequences of fraud;Chapter fifth suggests,it is suggested that enterprises should consider their own circumstances and economic environment when signing an agreement,and should not blindly gamble for financing.At the same time,we should attach importance to the company’s own development,improve the internal governance structure and strengthen the supervision of external institutions to prevent fraud after the signing of the gambling agreement.The final part is the conclusion part,which comprehensively summarizes the cases in this article and provides a broader research direction for the future. |
