Executive Incentives,Property Rights And M&A Performance

With the continuous development of the world economy,how to quickly stand out from the fierce competition has become a topic of great concern.As an effective means to rapidly integrate resources for rapid expansion,more and more companies are adopting this method in their development to make themselves bigger and stronger quickly to the peak.Executives,as the makers of M&A activities,have an important impact on M&A activities.Therefore,the study of executive motivation is a more suitable entry point for executive incentives.Executive incentives affect M&A behavior and even M&A performance.In recent years,China has vigorously promoted its scientific and technological innovation strategy,and the concept of "Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation" has continued to gain popularity.High-tech enterprises have gradually become emerging forces in listed companies,but they have their own distinctive characteristics.Samples to study the impact of executive incentives on M&A performance.In addition,since the “Salary Limit Order” was issued in 2009,the phenomenon of “Highly Priced Salaries” of state-owned enterprise executives has been partially curbed.Therefore,research should distinguish between different types of enterprises in order to obtain more accurate research results.From the perspective of executive incentives,this article selects the M&A activities of high-tech companies in Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2014 to2017 as a sample,and uses stata13.0 for regression analysis.Impact on M&A performance to test whether incentives have the desired effect.Then,the samples are grouped to examine the impact of executive incentives on M&A performance under different property rights.This article uses the method based on theoretical analysis and then empirical test.First introduce the background and meaning,and comb the relevant literature,then carry out the concept definition and theoretical analysis,sort out the logic,and finally use empirical research methods to verify the hypothesis to draw valid conclusions.In the empirical test,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Monetary nature of high-tech company executives salary is not related to short-term M&A performance and is positively related to long-term M&A performance;(2)High-tech companyexecutive equity incentives are positively related to long-term and short-term performance of M&A;(3)High-tech company executives' non-pecuniary compensation is not related to short-term M&A performance,It is positively related to long-term M&A performance;(4)Other conditions remain the same,monetary compensation incentives for executives of state-owned high-tech enterprises have a lower impact on M&A performance than incentive effects for non-state-owned enterprise executive compensation;(5)Other conditions remain unchanged,the impact of equity incentives on the performance of state-owned high-tech enterprises' executives on mergers and acquisitions is lower than the incentive effect on the compensation of non-state-owned enterprises' executives;(6)Other conditions remain unchanged,the impact of non-pecuniary consumption of executives of state-owned high-tech enterprises on M&A performance is lower than on non-state-owned enterprises.Based on the empirical research results in this article,high-tech companies should improve their own incentive mechanisms,especially companies of different natures should explore their own incentive methods to achieve the effect of incentives,and then improve merger and acquisition performance.