An Empirical Study On The Influence Of Debt Heterogeneity And Internal Governance On Over-Investment

As two basic financial activities of enterprises,the scale of investment is largely determined by financing,which is closely related to each other.Along the direction of fund raising and use,most of the discussions on financing may involve the investment decision of enterprises,and scholars' research on enterprise investment behavior also starts from the perspective of debt financing.The existing research results show that different types of debt show uncertainty in reducing the excessive investment behavior caused by shareholder-management conflict.Different creditors have mastered various degrees of enterprise information,the creditors of operating debt have certain information advantages,which could understand the operating conditions of enterprises.But “the soft budget constraint” will weaken the“camera governance” role of financial debt.The weakening of the status of bank creditors results that the supervision mechanism can be evaded.Although financial debt accounts for a certain proportion,it does not work as a constraint on management.What's more,both debt and internal governance structure can influence the investment decisions of enterprises,and these two may have a certain relationship in the process of enterprise investment decision-making.Based on the existing research,this paper adopts the method of combining normative research with empirical research.Firstly,we sort out the domestic and foreign literature which is related to the thesis topic,then choose a part of A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China from 2010 to2018 as research samples.On the basis of the residual from investment efficiency model,we selected overinvestment as sample data to carry on the empirical analysis.This paper focuses on the influence of different sources of debt on the enterprises' over-investment behavior,namely operational debt and financial debt.Considering that in companies with different levels of internal governance,the suppression intensity of debt to over-investment is different,and because the action mechanism of internal governance to restrain excessive investment has some homology with debt,this paper includes internal governance into the research system,and tries to put forward reasonable suggestions from both internal and external aspects that are conducive to the development of enterprises.The research results prove that: operating debt can restrain the over-investment behavior of enterprises.In addition to alleviating a certain degree of capital shortage,it can also play the role of supervision and restraint of creditors,while financial debt can't play this role effectively.Meanwhile,in the company with lower level of internal governance,the supervisory role of operating debt is stronger.And therefore,the conclusion of this paper will guide enterprises to attach importance to the supervision role of operational debt,pay attention to the establishment of strict contracts with upstream and downstream enterprises,and focus on the construction of internal governance mechanism and the display of supervision and incentive functions,which is conducive to correcting the over-investment behavior and economic development.