Research On Compensation Of Urban Utility Tunnel PPP Project Based On Performance Evaluation

The urban utility tunnel has played a significant role in solving the problems of "air spider webs" and "road zipper",improving the safety level of pipelines and disaster prevention and resilience.The participation of social capital in the construction and operation of the urban utility tunnel in the PPP mode has been widely promoted in China.At present,the government mostly pays compensation in the form of fixed compensation or through evaluation of project performance to ensure that project companies obtain reasonable investment returns.However,the fixed compensation method aggravates the financial pressure of the government and it can not effectively encourage the project company to improve its operation and management level.Implementation of compensation in combination with performance can avoid problems under the fixed compensation method.However,fuzzy performance evaluation standards and simple compensation measurement methods have inhibited the willingness of social capital to cooperate.Therefore,this paper attempts to improve the performance evaluation index system of PPP projects of urban utility tunnel,using performance as the basis for project compensation,and constructing a reasonable compensation model.It provides references for the implementation of compensation in China.Firstly,this paper analyzes the main problems in the compensation of PPP projects for urban utility tunnel in China,and proposes to improve them from two aspects: compensation standards and compensation methods.Secondly,the KPI method based on the key success factor(CSF)is used to establish a performance evaluation index system for PPP projects in urban utility tunnel.The evaluation index system is divided into three levels: the first-level dimension index and the second-level evaluation index,and thirdlevel measurement indicators.And then this paper uses the analytic hierarchy process to determine the relative importance weights of each level and each index,and establishes a list of project performance evaluation indicators.Then,using the principal-agent theory and introducing observable variables(performance),a principal-agent game model between the government and the project company is constructed.Based on the analysis of the project company’s optimal effort level decision and the government’s optimal reward and punishment coefficient decision in the two performance evaluation cycles,a government optimal compensation model is established.Finally,through a case of a urban utility tunnel PPP project in Wuhan,a comparative analysis of the compensation results between the project’s existing compensation methods and performance-based compensation is performed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model,and feasibility suggestions are provided for the project company and the government.Through the research of this paper,it is hoped to provide some reference for improving the compensation mechanism of the urban utility tunnel PPP projects in China,and promote the healthy development of the urban utility tunnel PPP projects in China.