The Analysis On The Dilemma And Outlet Of Local Financial Supervision In China Based On Stakeholder Theory

As an integral part of the national financial supervision system,local financial supervision plays an indispensable role in ensuring the healthy and orderly development of the country,especially the local financial industry.Therefore,how to improve the effectiveness of China's local financial supervision has become a very important issue that cannot be evaded in the field of theory and practice.The use of the theory of stakeholders in management to explore the problems of local financial supervision in China is a relatively weak area for the study of local financial supervision in the academic world.In the practice of financial supervision,the reason why local financial supervision will get into trouble is actually related to the "chain of interest"behind it.It is precisely because of this understanding that the actual dilemma faced by local financial supervision is regarded as a "dilemma of interest." Therefore,from the perspective of stakeholder theory,the participating stakeholders in China's local financial supervision process can be divided into four categories:local financial regulatory agencies,financial institutions that have been incorporated into the regulatory framework,financial institutions that are not included in the regulatory framework,and the general public.Wait.These four kinds of stakeholders have their own interest appeals,which leads to conflict of interests between them.Research shows that the four types of relevant stakeholders in local financial supervision are both independent and closely linked to each other,and constitute the "interest chain" in local financial supervision.Although each interest-related entity maximizes the starting point of its behavior selection based on its own interests,it cannot exclude the influence of other interest relationships,that is,the dilemma in local financial supervision is constrained by three kinds of interest relations:The pursuit of profit maximization of individual interests,Cross-interests that infringe the interests of others and Promote the overall interest of the development of the entire local financial market.At the same time,the solution to the dilemma of local financial supervision is not to ensure that a certain interest-related subject realizes all interests or to avoid the loss of benefits,but rather to seek a point of interest equilibrium from these four types of stakeholders in order to achieve regional Maximize overall benefits.The reasons for the emergence of interest dilemmas in local financial supervision can be examined from the macro,meso and micro perspectives.The macro aspect is related to the separate industry supervision system and regulatory policy,while the middle aspect is related to the interest coordination mechanism and local resource factors.The micro aspect is connected with the interest appeal,the starting point of interest selection and the choice of behaviorThe solution to the problem of the interest dilemma in local financial supervision can begin with the design and improvement of top-level systems,the construction of regional interest coordination mechanisms,and the conduct of relevant stakeholders.The design and improvement of the top-level system includes the gradual transition from split-to-industry supervision to mixed-industry supervision and the expansion and refinement of financial supervision policies;The construction of regional interest coordination mechanisms is mainly reflected in the strengthening of the coordination mechanism for financial supervision,the establishment of a financial information disclosure system,the improvement of the supervision mechanism of local financial supervision departments,the withdrawal mechanism of financial institutions' markets,and the deposit insurance system;The behavioral norms of relevant stakeholders mainly relate to the improvement of institutional setup and accrual of relevant stakeholders,and the strengthening of external links between relevant stakeholders.