After the blowout growth from 2014 to 2017,hedge fund in China has become a new role of institutional investors,whether hedge fund can play the role of shareholder activism and actively participate in corporate operations and corporate governance,which has attracted widespread attention and controversy from scholars.Hedge funds can play a huge advantage in corporate governance of listed companies while there may be some problems.The change of executives of listed companies is a common phenomenon in the operation,which will have corresponding impact on the corporate value.Therefore,CEO turnover directly affects the corporate governance effect.Based on the theory of shareholder activism,this paper uses the data of Chinese hedge funds from 2010 to 2017,combined with samples of CEO turnover at listed companies,to examine the impact between hedge fund positions on companies and changes in the CEO turnover.This paper focuses on the relationship between hedge funds and CEO turnover of listed companies from the perspective of corporate governance,exploring the role hedge fund activism in China.Based on the above research,this article draws the conclusion that the proportion of hedge fund holdings is positively related to changes in executives,which is more significant;the higher the proportion of hedge fund holdings,the more likely it is that CEO will be changed due to low corporate performance.Therefore,hedge funds positions increase the sensitivity of CEO turnover and company performance.The research in this article has significant theoretical and practical value for understanding the role of hedge funds in the change of executives of Chinese listed companies,and also directs how to improve corporate governance structure and to enhance corporate value. |