Research On Control Allocation,Real Earnings Management And Enterprise Value Relevance

The allocation of enterprise control rights mainly refers to the arrangement and distribution of control rights in shareholders,board of directors and management.The proportion of shareholders' shareholding determines its nominal control.As the executive of the board of directors,the enterprise management often has a certain degree of actual control,and the management or the large shareholders of the company sacrifice the overall interests of the enterprise in order to pursue their own interests.The irrational allocation of control rights provides more operating space for the major shareholders,management and other special interests,and the real earnings management activities,such as agency behavior,appear.Agency behavior may lead to the weakening of corporate governance.Under the state of control of the two position of chairman and general manager and the absolute control of large shareholders,the influence of agency behavior may be further amplified,making the influence of earnings management more uncertain on the value of the enterprise.The real financial situation of enterprises with surplus management behavior is often difficult to observe.In order to maximize their own interests,some stakeholders often use this point to manipulate the accounting income information of enterprises to make an accurate judgment on the real management of the company.With the emergence of a number of negative cases of earnings management,the capital market has paid more and more attention to earnings management,and the operating space of accrual earnings management is becoming smaller and smaller,and many enterprises have been manipulating the situation through real earnings management.Due to the establishment of real economic activities,the manipulation of earnings management by real earnings management is more subtle.Although enterprises can adjust the existing resources by increasing sales discounts,expanding production,reducing R & D expenditure and other real earnings management means,it can improve the business situation of enterprises,but at the same time,these real earnings management behaviors may also contain hidden risks,which have adverse effects on the long-term development of enterprises.Because the decision-making of earnings management is mostly taken by the stakeholders of the enterprise,and the decision making and executing of the earnings management is mainly implemented by the board of directors and the manager level,this paper studies the allocation of control rights and the real earnings from the proportion of large shareholders and the equal angle of the chairman and the general manager.The relationship of residual management,through theoretical deduction and empirical statistics,compares the difference between real earnings management and enterprise value under the condition of different control rights allocation,and hopes to provide some suggestions and references to clarify the relationship between real earnings management and enterprise value under the influence of control right allocation.