The Research On The Regulatory Eeffect Of Corporate Governance Mechanism On The Impact Of Corporate Financialization On Industrial Investment

As an important way for enterprises to obtain returns,industrial investment ensures the sustainable operation and long-term development of enterprises.As the main force of industrial investment,the real enterprise is an important economic unit to enhance the economic strength,and bears an important responsibility for the realization of economic transformation in China.However,in the past few years,China's national economic growth slowed down significantly,the real enterprises suffer from the impact of fierce industry competition and overproduction,the profits are getting lower and lower,and the industrial investment rate is declining.At the same time,the financial industry is highly profitable,and the financial products generally have high yield.In order to improve the short-term performance,some non-financial enterprises have set foot in the financial industry,trying to find new profit growth points,in order to drive the overall business performance of the enterprise.This also makes enterprises more dependent on financial investment for profits,and the trend of financialization is more and more obvious.However,finance has two sides.When it develops to a certain extent,it will squeeze the main business of enterprises,hinder industrial investment,and make the national economy tend to be "hollow".Therefore,in order to restrain the negative influence of the financial behavior of enterprises on the real investment,it is necessary to find a way to regulate the relationship between the two,and the corporate governance mechanism is a good mechanism to regulate the relationship between the two.In modern enterprise system,the separation of ownership and management is easy to cause agency problems.Generally speaking,the owner pays attention to the long-term growth value of the enterprise,and hopes that the manager will make a business decision that is conducive to the long-term development of the company;while the manager prefers to diversify the operation,and hopes to improve the short-term performance through diversification investment,so as to maximize the achievements of his hard work.The difference of the two management concepts may lead to the inconsistency of interest objectives.Managers may reduce the industrial investment of enterprises in order to pursue the high rate of return of financial assets,make the investment vision short-term and damage the interests of owners.A reasonable and effective corporate governance mechanism can alleviate the agency cost caused by theseparation of the two powers through the coexistence of incentive and supervision,reduce the financial investment behavior of the managers,make the executives pay more attention to the long-term development of the enterprise,and have more motivation to work hard for the maximization of the long-term value of the enterprise.Therefore,based on the corporate governance framework,this paper explores the regulatory effect of corporate governance mechanism on the impact of Corporate Finance on industrial investment.Based on the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2011 to 2018,this paper constructs an empirical model and uses the method of hierarchical regression analysis to analyze the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate finance and industrial investment.It mainly tests the following problems: the regulatory effects of executive equity incentive,executive compensation,the proportion of independent directors and equity concentration on the relationship between corporate finance and industrial investment.The results show that:(1)There is a significant "substitution effect" of corporate finance on real investment.(2)Executive equity incentive,the proportion of independent directors and equity concentration can play a positive role in regulating the relationship between corporate finance and industrial investment,in which equity concentration is a positive semi regulatory variable,the proportion of independent directors and executive equity incentive is a positive pure regulatory variable;the regulatory effect of executive compensation is not significant.(3)Regulation effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises,while crowding out effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.Finally,according to the conclusion of this study,the corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.The study of the above issues is of great significance for Chinese enterprises to reasonably control financial investment and prevent them from deviating from the main business.