Can Executive Academic Experience Reduce Stock Price Crash Risk?

The Chinese stock market has been developing for nearly 30 years,and the volume of issue has increased year by year,but the volatility of stock prices has not decreased year by year as the market economy continues to improve.The financial crisis in 2008 and most of the stock prices in 2015 were "cut off' and other financial phenomena touched the nerves of stockholders.The my country Securities Regulatory Commission once introduced measures such as the secondary fuse mechanism for A shares,but the results have little effect.The stock price crash not only affects the normal operation of the company's capital market,reduces the investor's investment confidence,it will even impact the stability of the financial market and hinder the healthy and stable development of the real economy.Therefore,how to prevent and mitigate the risk of stock price collapse has become an important issue to be solved urgently in academia and the real economy.There are many factors influencing the risk of stock price crash.Based on the“information hiding hypothesis”(Jin and Myers,2006),the cause of the stock price crash is the existence of information asymmetry and agency problems.The negative news that is intentionally hidden by informed traders is released collectively,or According to behavioral finance theory,investors' "bear market herd effect" caused the stock price to fall rapidly until a crash.Therefore,based on the personal characteristics of the executives who hide bad news,that is,executives,this article studies its impact on the risk of stock price crash.In order to explore this problem,this article uses the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as a research sample to empirically test the impact of executive academic experience on the risk of stock price collapse.This article is based on the existing research foundation on the risk of corporate share price crash and the academic experience of executives.It deeply explores whether the academic experience of executives has an inhibitory effect on the risk of stock price crash.It combines the internal governance level and the external supervision mechanism and the nature of property rights to explore whether it is a high risk The academic experience has a moderating effect on the inhibitory effect of the stock price crash risk,and further explores its impact path.Through literature reading and empirical research,this article finds that:(1)after controlling related variables,the academic experience of executives helps to reduce the risk of stock price crash;(2)the high-quality corporate internal governance level reduces the academic experience of executives to a certain extent Sensitivity to the inhibitory effect of stock price crash risk,that is,the lower the internal governance level of the company,the stronger the academic experience of senior executives to the company's future stock price crash risk.(3)High-strength corporate external monitoring mechanism reduces the sensitivity of executive academic experience to the risk of stock price collapse to a certain extent,that is,when the external supervision mechanism of the company is weak,the academic experience of senior executives will affect the future risk of corporate stock price collapse.The stronger the inhibition.It can be seen that the academic experience of executives and the governance mechanism of the enterprise as a formal system have a complementary role,and have an alternative role with the external supervision mechanism of the enterprise.(4)The property rights of state-owned enterprises reduce the sensitivity of the academic experience of executives to the risk of stock price collapse to a certain extent.That is,in non-state-owned enterprises,the academic experience of executives has a more significant inhibitory effect on the risk of stock price collapse.Through further empirical analysis,this article finds:(5)The academic experience of senior executives has suppressed the risk of stock price collapse by reducing the level of real earnings management,especially the manipulation of R&D expenses.The above conclusion is still valid after the robustness test.This article expands the factors that affect the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of executive traits,enriches and improves the research on the academic experience of senior executives and senior echelon theory,and deepens the understanding of the role and mechanism of academic executives in stabilizing the capital market,Which provides a theoretical argument for suppressing the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of executive recruitment.This article finds the supplementary effect of academic executives on the level of internal governance and the substitution of external supervision mechanisms,thus enriching the research on corporate governance.The academic experience of senior executives makes it have the inherent advantages of restraint mechanism,"reputation insurance role" and "structural hole".This discovery helps to give full play to the heterogeneity of high-level team construction.