The Impact Of The Governance Of The Board Of Supervisors On Corporate Performance Under The Heterogeneity Of Ownership Structure

With the continuous advancement of China's reform and opening up process,modern corporate governance of state-owned enterprises has been innovated and developed,which has played a role in promoting the improvement of state-owned enterprises' performance.In May 2017,the General Office of the State Council issued the "Guiding Opinions on Further Improving the Corporate Governance Structure of State-Owned Enterprises." The goal of this opinion is to transfer the control and management of state-owned enterprises to the company system by the end of 2017.Establish external directors on the board of directors.Based on the contradiction between ownership and management rights based on agency theory,it is inevitable to further strengthen the supervision mechanism accompanying ownership conversion.In the management of planned economy before the 1980 s,state-owned enterprises had almost no regulatory philosophy and independent regulatory knowledge.Since 1998,the state-owned enterprise audit commissioner system has developed into an outsourcing committee for the supervision mechanism of large-scale state-owned enterprises.The original intention of the transition arrangement has been standardized,and it has evolved into an enterprise board of supervisors system.As a supervisory board that provides strategic guidance,it is the center of the internal mechanism of corporate governance.However,with the progress of comprehensive economic reforms that separate ownership and management rights,this has led to agency problems for enterprises.Therefore,in order to alleviate these problems,independent supervision is required.This article focuses on the following four issues:(1)What is the current governance of the board of supervisors of state-owned enterprises?(2)What characteristics of the board of supervisors affect corporate performance?(3)Does equity concentration have an impact on the relationship between the governance of the board of supervisors and corporate performance?(4)Does the shareholding balance have an impact on the relationship between the governance of the board of supervisors and corporate performance?This article selects typical countries with a two-tier governance model,and compares the supervisory board systems of various countries in terms of the development and content of the supervisory board system.The board of supervisors of the German company is the upper-level organ of the board of directors,which is higher than the board of supervisors in terms of status and power.Secondly,employee representatives,banks and other stakeholders constitute an important part of the German board of supervisors,which improves the independence of the board of supervisors.The selectivity of Japan's internal oversight mechanism gives listed companies full choice of governance mechanisms and gives companies the opportunity to choose their own internal governance model.my country's board of supervisors system draws on the German board of supervisors system and Japan's supervisor system,and adopts a "two-tier" governance model in which the board of directors and board of supervisors coexist.From the perspective of the characteristics of the board of supervisors,this article studies its impact on corporate performance.By drawing on previous scholars' research and combining with the governance characteristics of China's state-owned enterprises,this paperstudies from four aspects,namely,the initiative,enthusiasm,independence,and professionalism of the board of supervisors,choosing the size of the board of supervisors,the frequency of board meetings,and the board of supervisors.The five shareholder characteristics of member shareholding,background characteristics of the board of supervisors,and percentage of external supervisors study the impact of board governance on corporate performance.With the continuous advancement of the reform of state-owned enterprises in my country,the modern corporate governance model has been widely used in state-owned enterprises,and it is imperative to improve the governance level of the board of supervisors.Therefore,this article has conducted a more in-depth study on the influence of supervisory board governance on corporate performance.First of all,this paper selects the state-owned listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research object,and obtains 4095 effective observation data by sorting and filtering the data.Secondly,through the literature reading method,the dependent variables of this paper are set as asset return and Tobin Q,and the independent variables are selected from the five indicators: the size of the board of supervisors,the frequency of board meetings,the shareholding of the members of the board of supervisors,the background characteristics of the board of supervisors,and the proportion of external supervisors.,Combined with empirical research to analyze its impact on corporate performance.Finally,the analysis in the full sample regression model shows that certain characteristics of the board of supervisors have a significant role in promoting corporate performance.There is a significant positive correlation between the shares held by the members of the board of supervisors and the rate of return on assets,that is,the state-owned enterprises adopting the equity incentive method to the members of the board of supervisors can increase the enthusiasm of the members of the board of supervisors,thereby improving the performance of the company.There is a significant positive correlation between the frequency of the board of supervisors and Tobin Q.The more meetings the board of supervisors holds,the more active the board of supervisors will be in performing its supervisory duties.The increased enthusiasm of the board of supervisors can improve corporate performance.The background characteristics of the board of supervisors and the proportion of external supervisors have no significant correlation with corporate performance.In order to study the influence of governance of the board of supervisors on corporate performance under different shareholding structures,this paper sets share concentration and shareholding balance as moderating variables.Through further analysis,it is found that shareholding concentration weakens the positive correlation between the frequency of board of supervisors meetings and corporate performance Relationship;equity concentration weakens the negative correlation of background characteristics of supervisors to corporate performance;equity concentration weakens the impact of external supervisors on corporate performance;equity checks and balances enhance the negative impact of supervisory background characteristics on corporate performance;equity checks and balances Degree weakens the relationship between the proportion of external supervisors and corporate performance.