State And Private Non-controlling Shareholders In SOEs And Private Firms And Risk-taking

In 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the eighteen officially proposed to"actively develop a mixed ownership economy",advocating cross-shareholding and mutual integration of different capitals,with the intention of promoting all kinds of ownership capital to make up for each other's strengths,promote each other and develop together.The reform of the mixed ownership system focuses on promoting the formation of the shareholding structure of the heterogeneous shareholder,and the change of the shareholder's ownership structure and the property right of shareholders will inevitably affect the daily operation of the enterprise.The academic community has found that the reform of mixed ownership can reduce the policy burden of enterprises,ease the soft constraints of enterprises' budgets,improve the efficiency of governance,improve the research and development efficiency and operating efficiency,and thus improve the overall performance of enterprises.However,there has not been any literature on the impact of the reform of the mixed ownership system on corporate risk-taking.From a micro level,the risk-taking of enterprises will improve the performance of enterprises and enhance the competitiveness of enterprises,which will help enterprises to maintain competitive advantage in a highly competitive market environment.From a macro perspective,the choice of enterprise risk-taking will affect the allocation of social resources,and then affect the vitality and development of the whole society.Therefore,under the background of the mixed ownership reform,it is of great significance to study the impact of state and private non-controlling shareholders in soes and private firms guided by mixed ownership reform on corporate risk-taking.Based on the data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share state-owned and privately held listed companies from 2003 to 2017,this paper conducts an in-depth theoretical analysis and empirical examination of the relationship between state and private non-controlling shareholders in soes and private firms and the risk-taking of enterprises,in order to find evidence of the impact of heterogeneous shareholder stakes on enterprise risk-taking.Then,combining variables of executive appointment and financing constraints,this paper studies how these two intermediary variables act on the relationship between heterogeneous shareholder stakes and enterprise risk-taking,and shows that the heterogeneous shareholder participation can influence the risk-taking through executive appointment and financing constraints.This paper also analyzes how the competitiveness of the industry affects the relationship between non-controlling shareholders and corporate risk-taking.The research content of this paper is mainly divided into the following six parts:The first part is the introduction.Firstly,this part introduces the research background of this paper.Secondly,it introduces the research significance of this paper from the theoretical significance and practical value.Then it introduces the research purpose and research method.Finally,it introduces the research content and framework,and innovationof this paper.The second part is a literature review.This part mainly reviews and sorts out relevant domestic and foreign literatures on the two aspects of mixed ownership reform and corporate risk-taking.This paper first introduces the original intention and path of mixed ownership reform,and sorts out the economic consequences of mixed ownership reform.Secondly,this paper sorts out the relevant literature of enterprise risk-taking from the perspectives of shareholder characteristics,enterprise characteristics,executive agency problems,executive characteristics and external environment.The relevant literature is organized from various angles such as the environment.Finally,a brief review of the existing literature is made.The third part is the institutional background,theoretical analusis and research hypotheses.This partintroduces the institutional background of mixed ownership reform,and combines theories and relevant literature research to analyze the impact of non-controlling shareholders encouraged by mixed ownership reform on corporate risk-taking,and then proposes the research hypothesis of this paper.The fourth part is the research design.The main contents of this part are as follows:First,the sample selection and data source are introduced,then the explanatory variables,interpreted variables,mediator variables,regulatory variables and control variables are defined.Finally,the regression model is designed according to each hypothesis.The fifth part is the empirical test and the result analysis.This section uses the ten models proposed above to test the hypothesis proposed in this paper,using model 1,model 2 and model 3 to test hypothesis 1,using model 4 and model 5 to test hypothesis 2,using model 6 and model 7 to test hypothesis 3,using model 8,model 9,and model 10 to test hypothesis 4.The sixth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations.This part first summarizes the research conclusions,then proposes relevant policy recommendations based on the research in this paper.Finally,it puts forward the shortcomings of this paper.The innovations of this paper mainly include three aspects:Firstly,on the basis of extensive reading of plenty of domestic and foreign literatures,this paper finds that most of the existing literature focuses on thepath and economic consequences of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,and there are few literatures on the mixed ownership reform of private enterprises.This paper studies the economic consequences of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the mixed ownership reform at the same time,further enriching the research on mixed ownership reform policies.Secondly,relying on the exogenous event of mixed ownership reform,this paper discusses the influence of non-controlling shareholders encouraged by the reform on the risk-taking of enterprises,and further explores the intermediary role of executive appointment and financing constraints,which is conducive to in-depth understanding of the impact mechanism of enterprise risk-taking,and enriches the research on the risk-taking of enterprises.Finally,this paper finds that the effect of mixed ownership reform in different industries is heterogeneous,suggesting that policy makers and enterprises that carry out mixed ownership reform should pay attention to relevant risks in decision-making,and provide some reference for further deepening of mixed ownership reform.