| After the separation of business ownership and management rights,the principal-agent relationship began to emerge.In order to improve effectiveness and expand the scale of business,the shareholders in the enterprise do not directly participate in the business management of the enterprise.Instead,they employ professional managers who directly manage the production and operation of the enterprise.The shareholders provide capital for the enterprise in order to gain wealth.Regardless of the number of shares,the increase in wealth of shareholders depends on the increase in stock price,and the continuous rise in stock prices can maximize shareholder wealth.As the performer of the fiduciary responsibility,executives pursue the goal of maximizing personal remuneration and leisure time.The inconsistency between the interests of the two parties has led to the issue of principal-agent,that is,executives may use its own information superiority to make decisions that harm the interests of shareholders.Equity incentives has been increasingly valued by enterprises because of its mechanism for relieving agency problems.Executives who are granted equity incentives can obtain a certain number of company stocks in accordance with the exercise conditions at present or in the future.As a result,their own interests are linked to the value of the company and coincide with the interests of shareholders,which can motivate executives to the enthusiasm for diligent work to raise the stock price.China has issued a series of laws and regulations,which provide corresponding guidance for listed companies to carry out equity incentive plans.At the end of 2017,the number of listed companies that have announced the equity incentive plans is more than one thousand,of which 246 new listed companies in 2017.As one of the internal governance methods of the company,the equity incentive mechanism has something to do with the external governance environment of the marketization process.The marketization process shows obvious regional differences in China,and this difference will inevitably affect the implementation effect of equity incentives.Based on the principal-agent theory,human capital theory,alignment effect,and managerial entrenchment,this paper takes the data of A-share listed non-financial companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange that have implemented equity incentives as the research sample,analyzing the effect on the equity incentives of listed companies.An empirical analysis was carried out,and the influence of the externalization environment of the marketization process on the effect of equity incentives was further examined.The study finds that in the same conditions,the greater the intensity of equity incentives of listed companies,the better the performance of enterprises;the higher the marketization process index,the better the performance of listed companies;the marketization process on the intensity of equity incentives and enterprises the relationship between performance has a significant positive adjustment effect.This paper links the external governance environment with the internal governance mechanism,and examines the impact of the differences in marketization processes between different regions on the effect of equity incentives,enriches the relevant literature on the factors affecting equity incentives.It also has certain practical significance for the design of equity incentive plan for listed companies. |
