Anti-Takeover Provisions Of Listed Companies,Management Power And Firm Value

In recent years,more and more hostile takeovers have occurred in the global market,and the economic effects of it are often negative.The hostile acquirers usually re-elect the target company's board of directors after the completion of the acquisition and arrange suitable candidates for the target company's board of directors,undermining the existing advantages of target company's management team,which leads to the target company becomes the victim of the short-term goal of the hostile acquirers.It can be seen that hostile takeovers are not conducive to the long-term development of enterprises.With the increasing number of cases of hostile takeovers,how to effectively prevent hostile takeovers has become a hot topic in academic circles.The nature of the anti-acquisition is to prevent the acquirers obtain the control of the target companies.Common anti-acquisition measures include the poison pill plan,the gold parachute,the white knight,and the anti-takeover provisions.There have been rich research results of the first three anti-acquisition measures.The research of the last anti-acquisition measures are relatively fruitful on the aboard,while there are few research results at home.Therefore,this article research the relationship of anti-anti-takeover provisions and company value,enriching another important factor which affects corporate value.This paper select the private company which listed on the A-share market as sample from 2006 to 2015.Through manual collection the anti-takeover provisions of sample companies,this paper analyzes the influence of anti-takeover provisions to company value.This paper selects three anti-takeover provisions,which are classified board terms,shareholder eligibility provisions for nominating candidates for directorship which include the restriction on the shareholding ratio and time.This paper tests the relationship he relationship of anti-takeover provisions and company value.Since management power has a greater impact on corporate value,this paper also studies the moderator effect of management power for the relationship between the anti-takeover provisions and the corporate value.The conclusions of the study are as follows:(1)The anti-takeover provisions are negatively related to corporate value;(2)The number of anti-takeover provisions are negative related to corporate value;(3)Management power has a positive effect on the negative relationship between anti-takeover provisions and corporate value.The empirical results of this paper support the “Entrenchment Effect”hypothesis,which mean the anti-takeover provisions make the management's position in the company more stable,protecting the managements' self-interest behavior,increasing agency conflicts between managements and shareholders,damaging the value of the company.Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,this paper proposes corresponding countermeasures,that is,to improve the legal basis of China's anti-acquisition,clearly define the anti-acquisition principle of listed companies in China,strengthen the actual effect of anti-takeover provisions,and accelerate the construction of professional managers' market,so as to make the anti-takeover provisions from the real significance to the effect of antiacquisition and promote the development of the enterprise.