Research On The Influence Of Control Right Features On Ultimate Owners’Reduction On Gem

The establishment of the GEM market in the past decade has become an important financing market with a high degree of marketization and active trading.The establishment of the GEM market provides a financing platform for small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises to help a large number of private enterprises’ growth.It is also the strong financing capacity,high liquidity and low listing threshold of this market,which makes some shareholders regard the GEM as a market in which money can be cashed out.After the listing,the performance of the companies changing,financial fraud and other black swan incidents occur frequently.In the end,the ultimate controllers obtained excess returns b,y reducing stocks and get the cash,while the small and medium investors suffered losses.The characteristics of corporate control rights influence factors of corporate governance greatly,which can be used as a reference for predicting the risk of ultimate controllers’ reduction.The internal corporate governance control rights include the shareholders level,the board level and the manager level.At present,the literatures on corporate governance mainly focuse on the research of the largest shareholder.On the one hand,it always ignores the influence of the board level and the manager level on corporate governance.On the other hand,under the current complex equity structure,the actual controller is taken as the research obj ect.Compared with the study of the first major shareholder only,it is more comprehensive and persuasive.Based on the above considerations,this paper takes the actual controller’s reduction ratio as the research obj ect,analyzes the characteristics of the three levels,summarizes the characteristics of the control rights with the actual controller’s risk reduction,and provides corporate governance,investor investment and supervision.Institutional supervision provides a useful reference.First,this paper sorts out the relevant literatures and theories,defines the related concepts,and theoretically analyzes the mechanism between the three levels of control rights and the actual controllers’ reduction ratio,and proposes hypotheses.In the process of empirical research,the GEM companies listed at the end of 2009-2014 were selected as research samples,and the paper analyzes the relationship between ultimate owners’ share reduction and control right features from the perspective of ultimate control rights,cash flow rights,the separation of the two rights.The results show that the higher the control and the separation of the two powers,or the greater the proportion of seats in the board of directors,the greater the proportion of ultimate owners reduce the holdings;the actual controller has the greater cash flow rights,or the position of general manager,can inhibit its reduction behavior.In addition,equity trading as a normal behavior in the market,whether the reduction of holdings necessarily indicates that the company s operations are unfavorable,it is worth re-examining.This paper further studies the changes in the return on net assets of the two groups after the reduction of control,and finds that the actual controller with lower control rights has a significant decline in performance after the reduction,while the actual controller with absolute control is reducing.After that,its performance changes did not change much before the reduction.Through the above analysis,this paper hopes to provide investors with an empirical basis for identifying enterprises with higher risk of reduction,and also provides a basis for the allocation of control rights and optimization of control within the internal governance process of enterprises,as well as more targeted supervision of regulatory agencies.The measures provide a useful reference.Through further research,I hope that the market can analyze the actual controller s reduction behavior in a more rational and considerable angle.