Study On The Nature Of Property Rights Of Enterprises And Their Over-indebtedness

State-owned enterprise financing has the convenience of Government Implicit guarantee,so it has a higher debt ratio.Some state-owned enterprises' debt ratio even exceeds the 70% warning line set by SASASAC,which leads people to worry about their high debt.However,the actual debt ratio of enterprises can not determine whether the debt is reasonable or not.Different enterprises have different industry nature and asset size.Research shows that enterprises have target debt ratio,and the target debt ratio is affected by industry and the nature of enterprises.The difference between actual debt ratio and target debt ratio can better reflect the situation of enterprises' debt.This paper uses the data of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2017 as research samples to test the relationship between excessive debt and property rights of enterprises.On the basis of MM theory,bankruptcy cost theory,Static Trade-off theory,agency cost theory,pecking order financing theory and dynamic perspective,this paper adds debt financing advantage hypothesis,equity financing advantage hypothesis and financial cost crisis hypothesis to the study of the nature of excessive debt and property rights of enterprises,and then analyses the nature of property rights and the status quo of excessive debt of enterprises.From the observation of the data,we get some rough ideas.In order to further study the influence of property rights on excessive debt from dynamic and static perspectives,we construct OLS and Logit models.Through Cluster clustering robust standard misestimation,we empirically test the relationship between excessive asset-liability ratio and the nature of enterprise property rights,too low interest coverage and enterprise property rights.The relationship between nature and the relationship between excessive asset-liability ratio and low interest coverage and the nature of enterprise property rights.Empirical results show that compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises are more likely to be over-indebted in the short-term static perspective,that is,under the short-term static conditions,the risk of debt default of state-owned enterprises is higher,but in the long-term dynamic perspective,state-owned enterprises are less likely to be over-indebted.Through a further study of the relationship between the three,we can find that the excess asset-liability ratio and the overload rate of overload interest are consistent,that is,the overload debt ratio from the long-term dynamic perspective is consistent with the over-debt ratio from the short-term static perspective.However,when the enterprise has excess debt ratio(the actual debt ratio is higher than the target debt ratio),the nature of stateowned property rights weakens the relationship between them.The positive correlation shows that the implicit guarantee of the nature of state-owned property rights reduces the negative impact of debt default on excessive debt in the long-term dynamic perspective of enterprises.With the continuous advancement of market-oriented reform,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,the welfare of state-owned enterprises is also decreasing,and the implicit guarantee of state-owned enterprises will be losing.State-owned enterprises are more likely to be over-indebted in the short term,and over-indebted in the long term.Insufficient solvency of enterprises in the short term will also aggravate the lack of liquidity in the long term.And it aggravates the risk of debt default and operational risk of enterprises.Therefore,credit institutions should pay attention to the change of property rights risk of state-owned enterprises.At the same time,state-owned enterprises should also do a good job of coping with the problem ahead of time,carry out appropriate bank credit and bond issuance.State-owned enterprises should broaden financing channels,increase the scale of equity financing,and alleviate the pressure of debt financing.