Study On The Impact Of Pledge Of Major Shareholder' Equity On Earnings Management In Gem Listed Companies

In the context of rapid development of China's capital market,the high liquidity and price transparency of stocks make equity pledge more and more favored by major shareholders and the financial market.Although gem listed companies can raise funds through listing,the high growth and industry characteristics of gem listed companies are still short of working capital,and equity pledge financing relieves the financial pressure of gem listed'companies.Due to the information asymm etry betw een the pledgee and the major shareholder of the pledged equity it creates space for the major shareholder to manipulate the enterprise surplus to raise the stock price.At the same time,in order to avoid the systematic risk caused by the decline of stock price,the major shareholders have the incentive to manipulate the ent.erprise surplus after the pledge of stock rights.The pledgee guarantees the safety of funds artificially,although the supervision of enterprises is increased,then the major shareholders will choose more hidden real earnings management to avoid the supervision.Although the pledge of major shareholders'equity is their own behavior,their influence status and operation mode in the company may be changed due to the separation of the two rights brought by the pledge of equity.Meanwhile.different ownership structures of enterprises play different roles in the pledge of major shareholders' equity and the manipulation of corporate earnings.Thus,it can be seen that major shareholders manipulate earnings management through their influence in the process of equity pledge,and different corporate equity structure characteristics have different binding force on major shareholders' behavior,which undoubtedly regulates the manipulation of earnings management by maj or shareholders'equity pledge to different degrees.In order to explore the mechanism of the effect of pledge of major shareholders'equity on earnings management of gem listed companies,and based on this,this paper studies the moderating effect of equity structure on the relationship between pledge of maj or shareholders'equity and earnings management.Firstly,this paper defines the concepts related to the research issues,such as pledge of major shareholders' equity,earnings management and ownership structure.Secondly,on the basis of elaborating the theory of stakeholders,this paper reviews the relevant research results in China and overseas,and summarizes the entry points of this research.Based on this,this paper takes the companies listed on the gem of shenzhen stock exchange from 2011 to 2017 as the research samples and constructs a multiple regression model for empirical test.The empirical study shows that:in chinext listed companies,the higher the pledge rate of major shareholders' equity,the higher the degree of real earnings management,and the lower the degree of accrued earnings management.Equity concentration not only enhances the positive relationship between the major shareholder's equity pledge rate and real earnings management,but also enhances the negative relationship between the major shareholder's equity pledge rate and accrued earnings management,which reflects the opportunistic behavior of major shareholders.The degree of equity checks and balances not only weakens the positive relationship between major shareholders'equity pledge rate and real earnings management,but also weakens the negative relationship between major shareholders'equity pledge rate and accrued earnings management,which reflects the governance effect of equity checks and balances.Finally,based on the empirical research results of this paper and the development status of chinext listed companies in China,this paper gives policy Suggestions on standardizing the financing behavior of major shareholders' equity pledge,improving the company's equity structure and strengthening external supervision.