Study On The Encroachment Behavior Of Dima's Ultimate Shareholders' Interests

Most of the current research on the ultimate shareholder interest encroachment focuses on the study of the "equity control chain".Although the centralized shareholding structure can strengthen the supervision of the company's management,it also causes the ultimate shareholder's interest in the minority shareholders.Under the background of the special "relationship" of Chinese enterprises,it is difficult to explain the ultimate shareholder control problem in family listed companies by the "equity control chain" alone.The "dual control chain" puts the "social capital control chain" into the research of corporate governance.Based on the theory of social capital,this paper explains the construction of "dual control chain" and explores the hidden path of the ultimate shareholder short selling listed company.Taking Dima Holdings as an example,this paper studies how the ultimate shareholder of family business in China uses the "dual control chain" to conduct interest encroachment,analyzes the motives,paths and economic consequences of the encroachment behavior,in order to strengthen supervision for the regulatory authorities,and prevent small and medium investors.The ultimate shareholder interest encroachment behavior provides a reference.The controlling shareholder of Dima Holdings is Dongyin Group,and the controlling shareholder of Dongyin Group is natural person Luo Shaoyu(the ultimate shareholder of Dima Holdings).The Roche family adopts a "dual control chain" approach combining the "equity control chain" with the "social capital control chain" to fully control the listed company Dima.This paper first calculates the deviation between the true control degree of Dima's ultimate shareholder and the degree of ownership control,and analyzes whether there is a tendency of interest encroachment.The calculation results show that the ultimate shareholder's two powers deviate greatly,and the interest encroachment motivation is strong.Secondly,through the construction of the ultimate dual shareholder "double control chain" to find out the path of interest encroachment,the analysis found that the ultimate shareholder through the formation of listed companies,hide the "equity control chain" and hide the "social capital control chain" to encroach.Thirdly,by analyzing the shareholder reduction,related party transactions and equity pledge behavior,we can find out the evidence that the ultimate shareholder uses the "dual control chain" for interest encroachment.Finally,the market value after the encroachment,the Z value warning and the main financial indicators are analyzed.The calculation results show that Dima Holdings show low market value and high financial risk and other adverse economic consequences after the ultimate shareholder interest encroachment.The research in this case will help to improve the information disclosure mechanism of listed companies,strengthen the supervision of the supervision departments on the integrity of information disclosure of family-listed companies,help strengthen the construction of relevant legal systems,regulate the behavior of shareholder reduction,and help improve small and medium-sized enterprises.The level of investor protection protects the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium investors from the aspects of convenience of convenience and litigation convenience.It is expected to increase the penalties for the encroachment behavior of the ultimate shareholders of listed companies,weaken the social capital validity of enterprises,and prevent the occurrence of the ultimate shareholder interests.