Game Analysis And Coordination Of Double-channel Agricultural Products Supply Chain Considering Green Degree

Various problems in the field of supply chain have always been the focus of scholars at home and abroad.With the rapid development of e-commerce and mobile payment,more and more consumers choose to use the mobile terminal for shopping.In addition to the original channels for selling products through retailers,manufacturers also choose to open online direct sales channels to directly sell products.At the same time as the national standard of living is gradually improving,resource and environmental issues are becoming more and more serious,and food safety issues continue to cause social concern,which has promoted the green manufacturing of agricultural products by manufacturers.Based on this perspective,this paper studies the game and coordination among members in the dual-channel supply chain considering the greenness of agricultural products.First of all,this paper studies the dual-channel supply chain of ordinary agricultural products without considering greenness.The supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer.Consumers can purchase products from retailers through traditional retail channels,or through online direct sales channels buy directly from the manufacturer.Manufacturer bears the transportation cost of network channel and introduces the variable of the network fee to the service level.The stackelberg game is used to establish a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model.The price,channel sales and member profits of agricultural products in different models are compared and analyzed,and a two-stage contract is established to promote cooperation among members.Subsequently,the green degree of agricultural products is quantified,and the variable of agricultural product greenness,the manufacturer's R&D cost,the retailer's publicity cost,the consumer's sensitivity coefficient to marketing efforts,and the sensitivity coefficient to the greenness of the two-channel agricultural products are introduced.Considering the greenness,price,channel sales and member profits of agricultural products in decentralized decision-making's model and centralized decision-making's model,and comparing and analyzing the results in different models,the coordination contract is also established to promote member collaboration.On this basis,we will compare the values of the variables in different models when considering the greenness of agricultural products or not,and analyze the impact of the variables such as channel market share,manufacturer transportation cost,R&D cost,retailer promotion cost,and consumer sensitivity coefficient on the greenness of agricultural products,prices,member profits,and the willingness of members to participate in green supply chains.Finally,a case study is performed by assigning values to model parameters.The analysis of the case includes two situations considering the greenness of agricultural products or not.The influence of agricultural product price,greenness,channel sales,member profit by channel market share,input cost and consumer sensitivity coefficient in decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making game model,Verification of the correctness of the previous conclusions.According to the results of theoretical and numerical analysis,the main conclusions of this paper are drawn: Consumers' sensitivity coefficient to agricultural product greenness,marketing intensity and transportation service level can directly affect the greenness,price and member profit of agricultural products in different decision models.The higher the sensitivity coefficient,the stronger the willingness of members to participate in the green supply chain;the more difficult the research and development of agricultural products is,the lower the willingness of manufacturers and retailers to participate in green production,by using emerging technologies to low the difficulty of research and development.And the higher the membership within certain thresholds,the input cost is conducive to the improvement of the total profit of the supply chain,but it continues to increase beyond the threshold,which is not conducive to the development of the supply chain.There is a maximum input cost of total profit,members should reasonably control the input cost;The willingness of members to participate in green production under decentralized decision-making As the market share of its own channels increases,the willingness of members under centralized decision-making is not affected by the channel market share.