Pricing Strategy And Fairness In Network Economics

In the era of mobile Internet,information concerning certain product travels fast at a very low expense due to users’ social connection.Hence,Users’ purchase behaviors are pone to influence each other,which bestows the traditional oligopoly pricing problem with new figure.We explore oligopolies’ new pricing strategy from three perspectives:(i)the value of users’ social information when it comes to oligopolies’ pricing;(ii)oligopolies’ competitive strategy under network effect caused by users’ social characteristics;(iii)the effect of fairness in discriminative price allocation.Uses’ social information possessed by social network operator can guide wireless network operator’s pricing strategy.it is assumed that social network operator and wireless network operator have incentive to cooperate with each other,namely,they form a coalition when running their business comprehensively and interacting with users.We formulated the interaction between the coalition and users as a two-stage Stackelgame game and derived the optimal pricing strategy.Additionally,the process of profits division between social network operator and wireless network operator is characterized by using a generalized bargaining model of cooperative game.We illustrate that social tie based pricing strategy will help operators gain more profit.Therefore,a win-win outcome occurs.Price competition is common economic phenomenon.We study price competition in an evolving duopoly market where prices offered by duopolies coexist all the time.We model pricing competition in a duopoly which figures network externalities using a sequential game.Duopolies move in an alternate way.The strategy of duopolies for current stage is based on the strategy of their opponents in last stage and subject to market demand.An algorithm based on dynamic programming is proposed to produce the optimal(competitive)price sequence.Simulation reveals that prices offered by duopolies track each other down to a threshold in small time scale and experience approximate periodic fluctuations in large time scale.Duopolies in our model are in a development of continuity,thus Bertrand paradox is avoid.Price allocation is a special instance of pricing problem.We envision the scenario where autonomous vehicles serve as taxis in city transportation.We study online price allocation when vehicle sharing is allowed.Clients call for services haphazardly and are heterogeneous in the willingness of vehicle sharing.We design working mechanisms for autonomous vehicles to help them make decisions about how to respond requests from clients and how to plan routes.During the sharing process,fair allocations are implemented,which guarantee envy freeness and maximin utilities.