| Securities analysts(hereinafter referred to as "analysts")play an important information intermediary role in China's capital market.Analysts have higher data collection and professional analysis ability than ordinary investors,and the high-quality earnings forecast information released by them has a strong reference role for investors to make investment decisions.A large number of studies have shown that the accounting information disclosed by listed companies is the main source of information for analysts,and its authenticity also directly affects the quality of analysts' forecasts.More and more scholars have found that,unlike the US,British and Japanese listed companies with more scattered shares,the listed companies in China are more concentrated.When equity is dispersed,the agency problem is mainly concentrated between the owners and the operators,while when equity is concentrated,the agency problem is mainly concentrated between the ultimate controlling shareholders at the top of the control chain and the minority shareholders.Therefore,the study of ultimate controlling shareholders has become an important research topic of corporate governance.A large number of studies have shown that ultimate controlling shareholders have a certain negative impact on the quality of accounting information of enterprises.Will the ultimate controlling shareholder influence the quality of the analyst's forecast by affecting the quality of the accounting information of the company? At the same time,the external governance environment,as an important external governance mechanism of enterprises,is an important institutional arrangement to protect the information environment of the capital market.Based on this,this paper attempts to bring external governance environment,ultimate controlling shareholders and analyst forecast quality into the same framework for research.This paper selects ultimate control right and separation degree of two rights as ultimate controlling shareholder measurement indexes,and takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2015 to 2017 as research samples to empirically test the relationship between control right,separation degree of two rights and analyst forecast quality.On this basis,financial development level,product market competition and institutional environment are selected as three external governance environment variables to explore the effect of three external governance environment variables on the relationship between them.The research results show that the ultimate control right and the separation of the two powers are negatively correlated with the quality of the analysts' predictions.It is further found that in regions with low level of financial development,weak product market competition and poor institutional environment,the negative correlation between the degree of ultimate control right and the degree of separation is more significant.The above conclusions were tested by remeasuring the robustness of the explained variables.According to the research results,the ultimate controlling shareholder has a large degree of ultimate control right and a high degree of separation between the two rights,so it will have a strong motivation and ability to misappropriate PBC(Private Benefits of Control)and urge it to manipulate accounting information to cover up the misappropriation.And then it influences the enterprise's accounting information quality,in turn,the analyst's forecast quality is reduced.A good external governance environment has a certain improvement effect.Therefore,in order to optimize the capital market information environment,improve the analyst's forecast quality,and thus improve the capital market resource allocation efficiency,this paper proposes three aspects: improving the company's internal shareholding structure,standardizing the analyst industry standard and constructing a good external governance environment. |
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