Supplier Relationship Transaction,internal Control And Financial Distress Risk Dissolve

As a major player in the market,enterprises have certain complexity and comprehensiveness.In order to avoid the high transaction costs caused by the lack of external market norms,enterprises tend to choose merchants that have previously cooperated and maintained long-term cooperation for relational transactions.Each enterprise which is in the relational transactions is a division in the supply chain,once an enterprise in the supply chain has financial distress,regardless of the company's investors,creditors,business operators,trading objects and other stakeholders will be seriously affected.In more serious cases,the financial distress will spread across the entire supply chain,eventually leading to the collapse of the entire chain.Therefore,in the supplier relationship transaction,if the enterprise is in financial distress,its relationship suppliers will not be able to be safe,and it is very likely to be adversely affected,and even fall into financial distress.Then,in order to reduce risks and ensure their own interests,does relationship suppliers choose to help financial distressed enterprises to resolve financial distress risks or take the self-interest as the first,thus bringing obstacles to the financial distress risk dissolve of the enterprise?Therefore,this paper cites the annual data of the Chinese A-share companies which was into financial distress risk and listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as the research sample.This paper explores the influence of supplier-relational transactions on the financial distress risk dissolve of enterprises and the differential impact of supplier relationship transactions on financial distress risk dissolve under different internal control and property rights.The study finds that supplier-relational transactions have a significant impact on the financial distress dissolve of enterprises,and the deeper the degree of supplier-relational transactions,the less likely the risk of corporate financial distress is resolved.The lower the quality of internal control,the higher barriers of information asymmetry between enterprises,the lower the mutual trust degree,and the negative correlation between supplier relationship transactions and financial distress risk dissolve is more significant.Due to the strong umbrella of the government,state-owned enterprises lack the motivation to get rid of their own difficulties.At the same time,they are more likely to cause high pipeline morality problems and exacerbate the self-interested behavior of relationship providers,thus enhancing the negative correlation between supplier relationship transactions and financial distress risk dissolve.Further research found that when the internal control quality of the company is low,the negative correlation between the supplier relationship transaction and the financial distress risk dissolve is more significant under the background of state-owned property rights.From the perspective of enterprise operation,this paper reveals the impact andmechanism of supplier relationship transaction on the financial distress risk dissolve of enterprises,and explores the path of enterprise to solve financial distress risk from a new perspective,which provides a new ideas for the financial distress risk dissolve of enterprises.At the same time,combined with the internal control of the enterprise and the nature of property rights,it explores the differential impact of supplier relationship transactions on financial distress risk resolution under different internal controls and property rights.And expanded research on the economic consequences of supplier relationship transaction,make up for the gap of the related literature.It also provides a useful reference for us to better understand the role of supplier relationship transactions at the corporate governance.