Corporate Tax Avoidance?Heterogeneity Of Institutional Investor And Inefficiency Investment

The traditional tax avoidance theory holds that corporate tax avoidance activities can reduce tax costs and enhance corporate value.However,based on the concept of tax avoidance agency,the separation of powers between modern enterprises and the inconsistent goals of shareholders and managers may aggravate the principal-agent conflicts,while tax avoidance will bring the problem of information asymmetry.According to existing research,information asymmetry and principal-agent problems are two important factors that lead to inefficient investment.Based on this,this paper firstly uses the evasion of corporate income tax as an entry point to explore whether corporate tax avoidance exacerbates the impact of non-efficiency investment.In addition,according to the existing literature,institutional investors as external regulators,institutional investors'own heterogeneity plays a different role in governance.Based on this,this paper further studies how institutional investor heterogeneity affects corporate tax avoidance and investment efficiency.This paper first summarizes the literature and related theories of corporate tax avoidance,investment efficiency and institutional investor heterogeneity governance,and proposes research hypotheses.Secondly,the data of listed companies of A shares in 2014-2017 is selected as the research sample.Descriptive analysis,correlation analysis and regression analysis were carried out,and the conclusions of this paper were finally obtained.The research results show that:(1)the degree of tax avoidance of enterprises is positively related to non-efficiency investment.Moreover,the degree of corporate tax avoidance is positively related to over-investment and is not related to insufficient investment.(2)Compared with transactional institutional investors,stable institutional investors' shareholdings play a negative role in regulating the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and excessive investment.(3)Independent and stable institutional investors' shareholdings play a negative role in regulating the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and excessive investment;non-independent stable institutional investors' shareholding has no effect on the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and excessive investment.