Study On The Manipulation Of Major Shareholders And Asset Valuation Appreciation Rate

In 2014,President Xi Jinping put forward that China's economic development has entered a new normal,and "supply-side structural reform" has become an inevitable choice for China's economy to break through the bottleneck of transformation and upgrading under the new normal.Whether in the process of mergers and acquisitions,reorganization,integration of excess capacity and optimization of resource allocation,or in the process of securities capitalization and deleveraging of PPP projects,asset valuation plays an increasingly significant role in discovering the true value of resources and assets and providing decision-making reference.Mergers and acquisitions,as a powerful means to adjust the direction of development,promote economic transformation and industrial restructuring,have become a main theme of capital market property rights transactions,including related transactions involving large shareholders of listed companies.At present,China's listed companies'concentration of "one share is dominant" and the prevalence of young appraisal industry evidence-based appraisal give large shareholders strong opportunistic motives and possibilities,making these related-party transactions save transaction time and reduce transaction costs,but also there is a great suspicion of interest transmission.This paper explores the impact of the proportion of major shareholders,the willingness and methods of manipulating the evaluation on the value-added rate of asset valuation in the related transaction of mergers and acquisitions,examines the methods of improving the service quality of asset valuation from the perspective of the demand side of asset valuation services,and protects the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.Chinese scholars' research on asset valuation in merger and reorganization mainly focuses on the selection and application of asset valuation methods,the value-added rate of asset valuation,and the analysis of the influencing factors of the difference between asset valuation results and transaction pricing.Among them,the research on the factors influencing the value-added rate of assets evaluation focused on the internal structure of assets and evaluation methods in the early stage,and then extended to plate factors,the relationship between trading parties,the types of mergers and acquisitions and reorganization,payment methods,etc.There are a few studies on the value-added rate of assets evaluation and market reaction,but few studies are conducted directly from the perspective of manipulation by major shareholders.Noting that there are many maneuverable behaviors in asset transactions between listed companies and large shareholders,this paper chooses a new starting point,that is,to analyze the maneuvering behavior of large shareholders,and to explore its impact on the value-added rate of asset valuation.This paper consists of two parts:theoretical analysis and empirical analysis.The theoretical analysis part is based on agency theory,information asymmetry theory and control rights income theory.Starting from the manipulation ability and willingness of major shareholders,it analyses whether major shareholders use their information advantages to influence asset valuation value by choosing evaluation institutions,payment methods,signing profit compensation agreements and so on for profit transfer?Empirical analysis uses correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to test the value-added rate of abnormal asset valuation as an alternative variable of evaluation manipulation,and finds that:The larger the proportion of major shareholders,the smaller the degree of manipulation and evaluation,the smaller the abnormal value-added rate;the asset-liability ratio of listed companies is negatively correlated with the abnormal value-added rate,and the return on net assets is positively correlated with the abnormal value-added rate.Major shareholders can manipulate by selecting an evaluation agency and signing a profit-compensation agreement,overestimating the underlying assets for tunneling,and the payment method has no significant effect on the abnormal capital increase rate.This paper puts forward some suggestions and measures,such as strengthening the construction of asset appraisal industry,strengthening the supervision of related party transactions,optimizing the ownership structure and improving corporate governance,to give full play to the proper role of asset appraisal in market transactions such as mergers and acquisitions,and to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.