Research On The Incentive Effect Of Employee Stock Ownership Plan In Listed Companies

This paper studies the incentive effect of employee stock ownership plan in listed companies.Referring to the definition of previous literature,the incentive effect of employee stock ownership plan is the effect of the implementation of employee stock ownership plan on enterprise performance.In 2014,China’s Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the policy of "Guidance Opinions on the Pilot Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plan in Listed Companies",which raised the implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plan to a new height.The proposal of the new policy will affect the employee stock ownership plan in listed companies to a great extent,and further affect the overall performance of listed companies on this basis.This paper studies the incentive effect of employee stock ownership plans in listed companies.This paper is mainly based on profit sharing theory and human capital theory.By drawing on the research results of scholars at home and abroad,and considering the impact of the new policy on the implementation of employee stock ownership plan,this paper focuses on the year after 2014.The sample is listed companies that implement ESOP from 30 June 2015 to 31 December 2016.Empirical research is based on the announcement data of employee stock ownership plan issued by listed companies during this period.The innovation of this paper is to select the enterprise capability index as the proxy variable of the incentive effect of ESOP.The incentive effect is the effect of the enterprise performance.The enterprise capability index is the performance of the enterprise’s internal strength,while the external performance of the enterprise’s internal strength is the enterprise performance.Compared with the previous single variable to measure enterprise performance,the enterprise capability index is a comprehensive system that includes the comprehensive operation of enterprises,industry potential and development potential.It is a variable that can measure enterprise performance systematically and comprehensively,which makes the analysis results more comprehensive and comprehensive.At the same time,every variable contained in the enterprise capability index is summarized and sorted out.The weight of each variable is calculated by using the method of entropy.Finally,the comprehensive weight of each part of the system is obtained,and finally the data of the enterprise capability index is obtained.At the same time,we control the other variables that will affect the performance of enterprises.Finally,we use the comprehensive index of enterprise performance as the agent variable of incentive effect,and use the corresponding model to carry out empirical analysis on the research issues in this paper.After that,two variables,ownership concentration and product market competition,are added to further analyze the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on the incentive effect of ESOP.Through empirical analysis,we can draw the following conclusions:(1)After the implementation of ESOP,the performance of Listed Companies in China has been improved,which means that ESOP can have a positive incentive effect on listed companies,that is,ESOP can promote the performance of enterprises.(2)Increasing the ownership concentration of listed companies can inhibit the incentive effect of ESOP.(3)Increasing the market competitiveness of enterprises will promote the incentive effect of ESOP.The conclusion of this study can not only enrich the relevant literature on the incentive effect of ESOP in theoretical value,but also provide empirical data for the development of the new round of ESOP in China,which has certain practical significance for the implementation and improvement of the new round of ESOP in China.